International Differences in Wage Inequality: A New Glance with European Matched Employer-Employee Data by Hipolito, Simon
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
International Differences in Wage
Inequality: A New Glance with European
Matched Employer-Employee Data
Simon Hipolito
EU-LEED Project
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7932/
MPRA Paper No. 7932, posted 26. March 2008 10:11 UTC
 1
 
 
 
International Differences in Wage Inequality: 
A New Glance with European Matched Employer-Employee Data* 
 
Hipólito Simón 
Universidad de Alicante 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using unique international harmonized matched employer-employee microdata from the European Structure of Earnings 
Survey for nine representative European countries, this comparative study examines the origin of international 
differences in wage inequality. Our novel evidence uncovers that global wage inequality is highly correlated with the 
magnitude of inter-firm wage differentials and that workplace- and job-related factors generally have a more significant 
impact on within-country wage inequality than individual characteristics. On the whole, European countries exhibit 
considerably different wage structures: they differ significantly not only in the extent of wage inequality but also in the 
relative influence of factors shaping wage inequality. Comparative analyses reveal that although cross-country differences 
in labour force composition play a part in the explanation, differences in distribution and, very specially, in labour market 
prices of workplace and job characteristics are primary reasons contributing to international differences in wage 
inequality.  
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Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J30, J31. 
 
1. Introduction 
Wage inequality is an outstanding feature of labour markets. On the one hand, it influences 
fundamental questions such as the economics incentives to skill acquisition by workers. On the other 
hand, it is a major determinant of disparities in living standards. As a matter of fact, the extent of 
wage inequality is strongly correlated in the OECD countries with the incidence and persistence of 
low-wage employment and, consequently, of poverty (OECD, 2004). Thus, unsurprisingly, 
considerable attention has been focused in the economic literature in recent years on the origin of 
wage inequality, its changes over time and its international differences (for authoritative reviews, see 
Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Katz and Author, 1999). 
Wage inequality exhibits a large international heterogeneity (for detailed descriptive evidence 
for the OECD members and a wide set of European economies see OECD, 2007 and Eurostat, 
2005, correspondingly). A growing body of comparative labour market research has attempted to 
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disentangle the origin of these persistent observed international differences in wage inequality. In one 
of the seminal contributions, Blau and Kahn (1996) tried to explain why wage inequality is 
substantially higher in the United States than in other developed countries. Their findings revealed 
that though differences in measured characteristics of workers explain some of the considerably 
higher levels of male wage inequality in the United States relative to nine other OECD countries, 
higher wage returns to observed individual characteristics and, very specially, greater residual 
inequality in that country are outstanding factors. On the basis that labour market skills may differ 
even among workers with the same observed human capital, later studies have taken additionally into 
account the role of cognitive skills in shaping international differences in wage inequality. Related 
evidence shows, yet, that greater dispersion of cognitive ability in the United States plays just a small 
part in explaining higher U.S. wage inequality relative to other developed countries, so that higher 
labour market prices and greater residual inequality remain as quantitatively considerably more 
important factors in the explanation (Blau and Kahn, 2005 and Devroye and Freeman, 2002).  
Given the role played by differences in labour market prices of individual characteristics in 
explaining international differences in wage inequality, comparative labour market research has also 
focused on alternative hypotheses to population heterogeneity for their elucidation. More 
specifically, two additional explanations have been put forward for these differences, namely the role 
of market forces and international differences in labour market institutions. According to 
explanations emphasizing market forces focus, relative wages of low skilled workers should be lower 
in those countries with a more abundant net supply of this kind of workers. Empirical evidence 
regarding this issue is rather mixed, yet. Hence, although international variation in supply and 
demand measures based on skill indices constructed using usual human capital indicators such as 
education and potential experience do not move in the right direction for explanations emphasizing 
market forces to provide a believable explanation (Blau and Kahn, 1996), some evidence of 
consistency with a supply and demand explanation of wage differentials by skill is obtained when 
skill is measured by cognitive tests (Leuven et al., 2004), which suggests that supply and demand may 
actually play a role in explaining international differences in wage returns. 
In turn, institutional explanations hypothesize that institutions such as collective bargaining 
and minima wage regulations compress wage differentials at the bottom of the distribution in 
countries with centralized wage-setting systems compared to countries with decentralized systems. 
Industrial relations system can affect wage inequality through several routes, such as wage 
differentials between union and non-union workers; less dispersion in union wages, very specially at 
the bottom of the wage distribution, and extension and/or ‘voluntary’ imitation of terms of 
collective agreements to non-union workers (for more details, see Blau and Kahn, 1996). The major 
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impact of labour institutions on wage inequality tends to be generally accepted as an uncontroversial 
issue, whereas the impact of labour institutions on differences in aggregate economic performance 
across countries remains a matter of debate (see, for instance, Freeman, 2007 and OECD, 2004). 
This institutional hypothesis is consistent with the evidence of Blau and Kahn (1996) that 
considerably higher levels of male wage inequality in the United States relative to other developed 
countries primarily reflect substantially larger dispersion at the bottom of the distribution. These 
authors also present a variety of evidence that labour market institutions, and in particular collective 
bargaining, are the most persuasive explanation for the observed differences between the United 
States and other countries, including negative correlations between a standard measure of wage 
centralization and overall wage dispersion and the 50-10 wage differential, respectively.  
Overall current evidence reveals, therefore, that although differences in population 
heterogeneity across countries can contribute to our understanding of varying levels of wage 
inequality, they explain in practice only a minor part of international differences in inequality, 
regardless of whether they are measured by human capital endowments and/or cognitive skills. It 
also suggests that both institutions and market forces may play a role in explaining international 
differences in wage returns to individual characteristics and, hence, in wage inequality, although it is 
not sufficiently informative on their relative contributions. Yet, it should be noted that the significant 
part played by residual inequality in shaping cross-country differences in earnings inequality implies 
that the bulk of their origin is largely unknown. 
This study is concerned with examining the origin of cross-country differences in wage 
inequality for a set of nine representative European countries on the basis of international 
harmonized matched employer-employee microdata drawn from the 2002 wave of the European 
Structure of Earnings Survey. Wage inequality exhibits a remarkable heterogeneity across Europe, 
which makes the examination of the origin of international differences in wage inequality across 
European countries particularly appealing. Let us also notice that the use of the European Structure 
of Earnings Survey matched microdata is a main advantage relative to previous studies on the origin 
of international differences in wage inequality, essentially based on microdata drawn from 
questionnaires to individuals or households, usually characterized by a high risk of measurement 
error in self-reported wages and a rather limited information on wage-determining characteristics of 
individuals and, very specially, of their workplaces and jobs. 
The recent worlwide burgeoning development of matched employer-employee data has 
allowed fundamental advances in our understanding of labour markets and, specially, of wage 
determination (for reviews, see Hamermesh, 2007, Abowd and Kramarz, 1999 and Haltiwanger et al., 
1999). Due to the availability of this type of data there exists, in particular, overwhelming evidence 
 4
 
for numerous countries that different firms pay observationally similar workers different wages (for a 
recent review of this empirical literature see Lane, 2008), so that wage differences between firms hold 
a strong influence both in the levels of wage inequality (see, for example, Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1991 for the United States and Cardoso, 1999 for Portugal) and in the changes of wage inequality 
over time (e.g. Nordström-Skans et al., 2007 for Sweden, Aagard et al., 2007 for Denmark or Dunne 
et al., 2004 for the United States). Current evidence suggests, furthermore, that the magnitude of 
inter-firm wage differentials may vary significantly across countries (Simón, 2005). On the whole, this 
implies that there is empirical plausibility to the argument that international differences in inter-firm 
wage differentials may play a part in the explanation of differences in wage inequality across 
countries. Notwithstanding, this is a heretofore largely untested question, which is plausibly 
explained by the fact that international databases with matched data are extremely scarce.1 For that 
reason, this sort of data has been used heretofore essentially in analyses for individual countries, 
despite the strong interest in their potential use for international comparisons (e.g. see Lazear and 
Shaw, 2007). The use in this study of the European Structure of Earnings Survey harmonized 
matched data permits, thus, to extend previous studies to re-examine the origin of international 
differences in wage inequality in a novel, more comprehensive fashion. These data allow to consider 
the influence of a wider set of wage-determining factors than microdata coming from individual or 
household surveys and, in particular, to shed light on the issue whether international differences both 
in the wage returns and in the distribution of workplace and job characteristics are relevant sources 
behind international differences in wage inequality. 
In the empirical work below, the origin of within-country levels of wage inequality is firstly 
examined by means of the decomposition technique developed by Fields (2003). This technique 
provides an exact decomposition of a country’s overall level of wage inequality based on the 
contributions of wage-determining factors, so that it allows evaluating systematically the relative 
contribution of each separate factor to inequality. After that, an adaptation of the Fields (2003) 
technique is employed in order to analyse the sources of international differences in wage inequality. 
Then, in order to provide a richer picture of cross-country differences in wage inequality, the 
decomposition methodology recently developed by Yun (2006) is used, additionally, in this part of 
the empirical analysis. This technique is a synthesis of the methodologies of Fields (2003) and the 
                                                 
1 As far as we know, the only international matched employer-employee data currently available is, indeed, the European 
Structure of Earnings Survey. However, accessibility to their microdata has been traditionally highly constrained by data 
confidentiality. Consequently, this survey has been used basically for descriptive analyses (e.g. Eurostat, 2005), with the 
exception of a number of international comparative studies carried out with the 1995 wave of the survey in the context 
of a former project financed by the European Commission under extremely restrictive conditions of access to the 
microdata (inter alia, Lallemand et al., 2007, Plasman et al., 2007 and Simón, 2005): 5th framework project ‘Pay Inequalities 
and Economic Performance’ (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/piep). 
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full-distributional accounting method devised by Juhn et al. (1993). Yet, in contrast with the 
technique of Fields (2003), whose results are informative of the gross contribution of each single 
explanatory factor, it allows to release the gross contribution of each factor in two parts, explained in 
terms of the differences between countries in the price and the endowment, respectively, of the 
factor. Therefore, it permits to compute both aggregate and detailed decompositions of international 
differences in wage inequality distinguishing between price and endowment effects. This is 
particularly relevant insomuch each variable can contribute to international differences in global 
inequality through cross-country differences both in its remuneration and in its distribution, and, 
very specially, given the interest of this research in assessing the isolated effect of individual, 
workplace- and job-related factors.  
A major finding of the study is that the magnitude of inter-firm wage differentials is strongly 
correlated with global wage inequality across European countries. Thus, consistent with this result, 
although workforce characteristics play a non-negligible influence, total wage inequality is generally 
more strongly associated in every European country to workplace and job attributes. Nevertheless, 
the particular influence on wage inequality of workplace, individual and job characteristics displays 
significant differences across European countries and, as a result, these factors play a significant part 
in shaping international heterogeneity in wage inequality. Comparative analyses confirm, in particular, 
the finding of previous studies that international differences in labour force composition play some 
influence on international differences in wage dispersion. Yet, our novel evidence uncovers that 
workplace and job characteristics are more influential than individual characteristics in shaping 
international differences in wage inequality.  
 Also of concern is that the influence of observed characteristics in shaping international 
differences in wage inequality is explained comparatively more by differences in their returns whereas, in 
contrast, cross-country differences in their endowments are less influential. This finding suggests that it 
is the difference in weights placed on wage-determining factors rather than differences in the 
distribution of workplace, job and individual measured characteristics that best explain international 
differences in wage inequality. The particularly significant part played by differences in the rewards to 
workplace characteristics in the explanation of international differences in wage inequality suggests, 
furthermore, that international differences in inter-firm wage differentials are not mostly driven by 
differences in returns to firm characteristics and not by heterogeneity in firm populations. It is also 
consistent, in line with overall obtained evidence, with the hypothesis that there is more margin to inter-
firm wage differentials in countries with decentralized wage-setting systems.  
 The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and presents summary 
statistics on the extent of wage dispersion and the wage-setting institutions of the countries in the 
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sample. Section 3 describes the methodologies used in the analysis. Section 4 examines the sources of 
within-country and international differences in wage inequality. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
2.1. Data Source 
The microdata used in this study are drawn from the 2002 European Structure of Earnings 
Survey (ESES hereafter). This dataset is a collection of national surveys conducted in member states 
of the European Union (as well as Iceland and Norway) according to a common methodology under 
the auspices of the Statistical Office of the European Communities. It provides detailed and 
comparable information on the level and structure of remuneration of employees, their individual 
characteristics and the enterprise or local unit to which they belong. This study draws on the 2002 
national data samples for Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and a non-EU country, Norway. The ESES survey covers workplaces with more 
than 9 employees in sections C to O of the economic activity classification scheme NACE,2  except 
for Norway, Latvia, Italy and Portugal where sectors L, M, N and O (in turn, public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security; education; health and social work and other community, 
social and personal service activities) are not covered and Spain, where sector L is not covered and, 
thus, industry coverage is narrower than elsewhere.3 Let us notice that the exclusion of small 
entreprises may affect the figures for southern countries in particular, given that a significant portion 
of total private employment in these countries corresponds to this segment of the labour market. 
A prominent feature of the ESES is that it consists of matched employer-employee data with 
a sample of workers at each workplace. The ESES collects information, usually provided by the 
management of the establishments, on demographic information for workers (earnings, sex, age, 
level of education, tenure in the firm, occupation, type of contract and full-time/part-time indicators) 
along with detailed information for each respondent’s establishment (industry, size, type of financial 
control and different features of workplace’s labour force composition derived from the 
observations of each workplace included in ESES: the ratio to all employees in the wokplace of 
                                                 
2 The national samples of Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Slovakia actually also cover workplaces with 
less than 10 employees. In order to work with similar types of workplaces in all the countries, they have been dropped 
from the samples.  
3 When samples in countries with a wider coverage are restricted to sections C to K of the NACE classification, 
international differences in wage inequality exhibit, with some exception, very slight changes. Thus, as a matter of fact, 
the variance of log hourly wages is 0.399 in Lithuania (compared to 0.385 with the sample with wider sectoral coverage), 
0.271 in Spain (0.274), 0.256 in Slovakia (0.252), 0.210 in the Czech Republic (0.196) and 0.321 in the Netherlands 
(0.254). 
 7
 
women, low- and high-educated workers and the average age and tenure).4 The analysis is restricted 
to individuals aged 18-64. The final national samples are in the range between 58,049 and 972,729 
workers (for Portugal and the Czech Republic, respectively) and between 472 and 21,615 
establishments (Slovakia and Spain) and the number of workers per workplace in the sample is in the 
range between 8.8 and 831.2 (Portugal and Slovakia). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. 
The earnings measure used in the empirical analysis is the gross hourly wage. Thus, the goal 
of the research is to explain international differences in the distribution of the price of labour rather 
than in labour incomes. Earnings used to calculate hourly wages concern to a ‘normal’ reference 
month and cover remuneration in cash paid by the employer before deductions for tax and employee 
social security contributions. They comprise all payments different from overtime pay, including 
commissions, travelling expenses, premium payments for shift, night and weekend work and all 
bonuses and allowances, regardless of whether or not they are paid regularly in each monthly pay 
period (thus, they also cover annual bonuses as holiday bonuses, 13th and 14th monthly salaries, profit 
sharing and allowances for leave not taken)5. Let us emphasize that the wage information in the 
ESES data has an important advantage in that the wage definition is exactly the same across 
countries.  
2.2. Descriptive Evidence 
 Table 1 documents wage dispersion and the main features of wage-setting institutions of the 
countries in the sample. Wage dispersion shows a large heterogeneity according to different wage 
inequalities measures and, though the magnitudes of international differences displays slight differences, 
the ranking of the countries is invariant regardless of the particular inequality measures. Thus, the more 
dispersed wage structure is found in Latvia (where, as a matter of fact, the variance of log hourly wages 
is 0.529 and the ninetieth-tenth percentile log-wage differential is 1.786) and the more compressed 
distribution in Norway (0.136 and 0.891, respectively). Wage inequality in the remaining countries lies in 
between that of the two former countries, being particularly important in Lithuania (0.385 and 1.591) 
and Portugal (0.376 and 1.545) and, to a lesser extent, in Spain (0.274 and 1.289), Slovakia (0.252 and 
                                                 
4 Information on the type of collective collective agreement covering the workplace is also available for some of the 
countries in the sample (Norway, Italy and the Netherlands are exceptions). Yet, due to the presence of different 
institutional wage-settings and, consequently, types of collective agreements across countries it is troublesome to design 
proper common indicators to all the countries. Likewise, a variable regarding the main market of the firm is available only 
for a small subset of countries. Information on these issues has not been used in subsequent comparative empirical 
analyses.  
5 According to ESES data, bonuses paid annually are not negligible and exhibit a remarkable cross-country heterogeneity: 
they represent in industry and services between 1-3% of mean annual earnings in Norway and Lithuania, around 5% in 
Latvia, 6% in Italy and 9% in the Netherlands and between 14-17% in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Portugal and Spain 
(Eurostat, 2005). 
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1.190) and the Netherlands (0.254 and 1.139), and comparatively less significant in the Czech Republic 
(0.196 and 1.060) and Italy (0.175 and 1.002).  
 In order to put this evidence into a wider perspective, Table A.2 in the Appendix reports earnings 
dispersion for the European Union-25 countries plus Norway, as measured by the 90-10 interdecile 
ratio. (Although, interestingly, evidence in Table A.2 is drawn from the same survey used in this study, 
the 2002 wave of the European Structure of Earnings Survey, unfortunately, it does not include 
information on the specific earnings measure). It is confirmed that earnings inequality exhibits a very 
important heterogeneity across Europe: wage structures are particularly compressed in Nordic countries 
(the 90-10 interdecile ratio in these countries is in general around 2) whereas, on the other hand, they are 
particularly dispersed in some of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland and Estonia (the 90-10 interdecile ratio goes in this group of economies 
from 4.5 in Slovenia to 4.94 in Estonia). Very interestingly, the countries embraced by this study almost 
cover the full range of heterogeneity in earnings inequality in Europe. Hence, earnings disparities in 
Latvia and Lithuania are in the upper range of the EU countries (to be more precise, only Estonia 
exhibits a significantly higher wage inequality than them); earnings dispersion in Norway lies in the lower 
range of this group of countries, resembling other Nordic countries (actually, only Finland ranks below 
Norway); whereas the remaining countries are in the middle of the ranking according to the extent of 
inequality. An additional point to note is that the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the two new member 
states of Central and Eastern Europe with the lowest earnings inequality and, hence, that they do not fit 
with the very dispersed wage structures displayed in general by these countries.6 
As emphasized in the introduction, certain labour institutions are expected to be major 
factors leading to more or less dispersed wage structures. In particular, a centralized collective 
bargaining system and a binding statutory minimum wage may generate a comparatively compressed 
wage structure (Blau and Kahn, 1999, Nickell and Layard, 1999). With the exception of Norway and 
Italy, statutory minima wages exist in all the countries in the study. Yet, they are usually set in all 
them in low levels by international standards (minima wages go from 33% of the average gross wage 
in Spain to 45% in the Netherlands). In turn, Norway, Italy Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands 
display centralized systems of collective bargaining, which are usual in the ‘corporatist’ former 
European Union-15 countries. Thus, collective bargaining is conducted in Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
the Netherlands mainly on an industry-wide level, whereas wage-setting coordination at an economy-
                                                 
6 The new member states of Central and Eastern Europe witnessed a widening of the earnings distribution during their 
transition stages, starting from the comparatively low levels of inequality which were a feature of their former centrally 
planned systems. Yet, the widening of earnings distribution concentrated in the early phase of the transition, so that the 
trend towards greater inequality in most transitional countries tapered off during the late 1990s (Rutkoswki, 2001).  
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wide level is specially important in Norway. Accordingly, collective bargaining exhibits in these five 
countries a high coverage rate (in the order of 70-80%), with a significant coordination among the 
different units of negotiation. On the other hand, collective bargaining in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia displays a low coverage rate (14% in Lithuania, 20% in Latvia, 25% in 
the Czech Republic and 50% in Slovakia), is mainly conducted on a company level (with the 
exception of Slovakia) and the coordination among the units of negotiation is generally low (this sort 
of decentralized collective bargaining is also prevalent in the other new members states of the 
European Union of Central and Eastern Europe: EIRO, 2002).  
Overall, obtained evidence for the countries in the sample offers a weak support to the 
hypothesis that institutional differences play a role in driving the pattern of international 
heterogeneity in wage inequality. Therefore, bivariate correlations across countries between the 
institutional indicators and the wage dispersion measures in Table 1 are systematically negative, but 
they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The lowest wage inequality in the set of 
countries is actually found in Norway and Italy, two countries with centralized wage-setting systems, 
and the highest inequality corresponds to Lithuania and Latvia, with decentralized systems. Yet, 
evidence on the influence of institutions on wage inequality is more mixed for the remaining 
countries: Spain and Portugal exhibit a significantly higher wage inequality than both the 
Netherlands, an economy with broad institutional similarities, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
two countries with comparatively decentralized wage-setting systems. On the other hand, it is also 
observed that the lower level of wage inequality in Norway and Italy reflects considerably more 
compression at the bottom of the distribution (hence, the 50-10 percentile log-wage differential in 
Norway and Italy is 0.316 and 0.398, respectively, by far the lowest differentials of all the countries in 
the sample), a result which is consistent with a role for unions in ‘bringing up the bottom’ of the 
wage distribution. Nevertheless, the remaining countries exhibit (with the exception of Lithuania) a 
roughly similar degree of wage inequality at the left tail of the wage distribution: their 50-10 
percentile log-wage differentials lie in between 0.493 and 0.747 (the coefficient of variation of the 
indicator for the nine countries is of 23.1%). In contrast, international differences in wage inequality 
across Europe actually reflect more the influence of substantially larger differences in inequality at 
the top of the distribution (90-50 percentile log-wage differentials lie in between 0.544 and 1.198, 
with a coefficient of variation for the nine countries of 29.9%), a result which, prima facie, does not 
conform to standard institutional explanations. 
Additional evidence in Table 1 suggests that cross-country differences in wage dispersion in 
Europe are significantly related to the dispersion of workplace wage differentials. (Details of the 
method employed for calculating their dispersion are given in the notes of Table 1.) Thus, the 
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bivariate correlation across countries between wage inequality and the magnitude of workplace wage 
differentials is always highly positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, regardless of 
the inequality measure (bivariate correlations are systematically higher than 0.9, with the only 
exception noted below), although the influence of inter-workplace wage differentials in shaping wage 
inequality may be weaker at the bottom end of the wage distribution (thus, the magnitude of 
workplace wage differentials and the 50-10 percentile log-wage differential exhibit positive but non-
significant correlations around 0.5). It has been hypothesized that there should be more scope to 
inter-firm wage differentials in countries with decentralized collective bargaining systems, with an 
emphasis on single-firm agreements, than in countries where bargaining is conducted on an industry-
wide level (Blau and Kahn, 1996 and Devroye and Freeman, 2002). Bivariate correlations across 
countries between the institutional indicator on the extent of centralization of collective bargaining 
and the dispersion of inter-firm wage differentials are negative (although non-significant) and 
considerably higher when heterogeneity in individual and job characteristics is controlled for, a 
finding which is consistent with the plausibility of this institutional explanation for European 
countries. 
It should be noted, yet, that wage residual dispersion (that is, estimations of the remaining 
wage inequality net of the effect of inter-firm wage differentials) is positively correlated across 
countries with global inequality measures (see last rows in Table 1), very specially when the effect of 
a full set of individual and job characteristics is also controlled for (bivariate correlations are in this 
case significant at 10%). Overall, this evidence suggests that, together with the influence of inter-firm 
wage differentials and individual and job heterogeneity, unobserved elements may also be relevant 
factors shaping international differences in wage inequality across European countries. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Decomposing within-country wage inequality levels: the Fields (2003) methodology  
As noted in the introduction, the first part of the empirical analysis consists of an 
examination of the determinants of the levels of inequality in each country by applying the technique 
developed by Fields (2003). This methodology is based on regression analysis, and departs from the 
OLS estimation of a semilogarithmic individual wage equation. Suppressing individual subscripts for 
ease of presentation, the equation is of the form: 
AK
k
A
k
A
k
AA εXββw ++= ∑ −=110                        (1) 
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where Aw  corresponds to the logarithm of the gross hourly wage of worker i in country A, and 
A
kX and 
Aε  are the k-th explanatory variable and a random error term, respectively.  
Taking in both sides of equation (1) the covariance with respect to the log-wages, the 
variance of log-wages in country A can be expressed by means of the following identity: 
       AAAA
k
A
k
AAAK
k
A
k
A
k
t wε
K
k wXβwεwXβw
σσσσσ
,
1
1 ,,,
2
1
1
+=+∑= ∑ −=−=                     (2) 
where 2Awσ , AAkAk wXβσ ,  and AA wεσ ,  are, respectively, the variance of log-wages, the covariance of 
A
k
A
k Xβ  
and Aw  and the covariance of Aε  and Aw . Moreover, 2
, AAA εwε
σσ = , as long as, by the properties of 
the OLS estimator, 0
,
=A
k
A xε
σ , where k=1,…, K-1. 
Dividing both sides of the equation (2) by 2Awσ , equation (3) follows: 
∑∑ =−= =+= Kk AkwwεKk wXβ Sσσσ AAAAAkAk 1 ,2,11 , )(1                     (3) 
where the ‘relative factor inequality weight’ AkS ,  measures the relative weight in the variance of log-
wages in country A of the k-th explanatory variable. These factors are made up of K-1 factors 
corresponding to the explanatory variables and factor K, corresponding to the residuals, that is dealt 
with like a factor with coefficient equal to 1 ( AKβ =1). This last factor is defined as 
2
, AAA wwε
σσ , 
whereas in the case of the remaining K-1 factors corresponding to the explanatory variables t,kS  the 
corresponding factor is defined as7: 
AAA
k
A
k
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k
A
k wwXX
A
kwwXβAk
σρσβσσS )(
,
2
,,
==               (4) 
where A
kX
σ  is the standard deviation of A
k
X  and AA
k wX
ρ
,
 is the coefficient of correlation between 
A
k
X and Aw  (that is to say, AA
k
AA
k
AA
k wXwXwX
σσσρ
,,
= ). Thus, the influence of each variable in wage 
inequality depends on its coefficient and on its dispersion. 
As long as 1
1 ,
=∑ =Kk AkS , the variance of log-wages in country A can be exactly broken down 
in the sum of the proportion explained by each explanatory variable in equation (1). Moreover, if the 
residual factor is excluded, the sum of the remaining factors is equal to the unadjusted coefficient of 
determination of the regression, so that )(21
1 ,
AK
k Ak
wRS =∑ −= . 
                                                 
7 Notice that if Akβ and AA
k wX
ρ
,
have opposite signs, the sign of AkS ,  can be negative. 
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A shortcoming of this method is that the decomposition of the wage inequality that is 
provides is a priori valid solely for the variance of the log as inequality measure. Although this is a 
natural measure of inequality dispersion in the context of a regression analysis and its use to quantify 
inequality is relatively standard in economic literature, it displays certain non-desirable characteristics, 
like the fact that it violates the Pigou-Dalton principle of transference (Sen, 1973 and Foster and Ok, 
1999). Yet, as Shorrocks (1982) demonstrated, if a variable can be expressed as the sum of different 
factors, under six generic axioms the relative weight in the inequality of the variable of factor AkS ,  as 
expressed in equation (4) is invariant for all the measures of inequality that fulfil certain properties (in 
particular, being continuous and symmetrical and taking a zero value if all the observations 
correspond to the average of the sample). Following Fields (2003), the theorem of Shorrocks (1982) 
on the decomposition of inequality on additive components is of direct application, by 
homeomorphism, to the context of the regression analysis based on the equation (1), whenever the 
explanatory variables enter the equation linearly.8 For that reason, the results expressed by equations 
(3) and (4) are applicable to other measures of inequality different from the variance of the 
logarithms that satisfy the previous conditions. This circumstance implies that the proportion of 
wage inequality explained by each factor Sk, (and, by extension, the overall results of the 
decomposition), is invariant, under certain conditions, for an ample set of inequality measures, 
including, as a matter of fact, the Gini index and the indices of the family of generalized entropy. 
3.2. Decomposing international differences in wage inequality 
3.2.1. The Fields (2003) methodology 
In the empirical analysis, an extension of the Fields (2003) technique is initially applied to 
break down inter-country differences in the level of the wage inequality on the contribution of 
separate factors. In this case, the contribution of the k-th variable to differences in inequality 
between countries A and B as measured by the difference in the variance of log-wages can be 
expressed as: 
            )()(Π ,, BBkAAkk ISISI −=                                (5) 
where Ic is the variance of log-wages in country c (c=A, B) and Sk,x is the relative weight of factor k in 
the level of wage inequality of country c.9 Factor Πk(I) picks up the part of inter-country differences 
in wage inequality that is explained by the k-th variable, so that )( ,1 , BBkA
K
k AkBA
ISISII −=− ∑ = . 
                                                 
8 As a result, the use of interactions between variables is not possible when applying this technique. 
9 The Fields (2003) decomposition can actually be applied to any inequality measure. Notice that the contribution of each 
variable to international differences in wage inequality depends on the choice of inequality measure. 
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Whenever that IA>IB, a positive value (negative) of Πk(I) indicates that factor k contributes to a 
greater (smaller) inequality in country A relative to country B.  
Although the Fields (2003) technique allows obtaining information on the contribution of 
each factor to inter-country differences in the level of wage inequality and, thus, provides a rich 
picture of its origin, it does not permit to distinguish between coefficients (price) and characteristics 
(quantity) effects for each variable. For that reason, the Yun (2003) decomposition technique is used, 
in addition, in the empirical analysis. Its main advantage relative to the Fields (2003) decomposition 
is, precisely, that it allows to examine the influence on wage inequality of international differences in 
both endowments of observed characteristics and their returns. 
3.2.2. The Yun (2006) methodology 
The Yun (2006) methodology is a synthesis of the methodologies of Fields (2003) and Juhn et 
al. (1993). This later technique involves building hypothetical wages for each individual, then using 
the hypothetical wage distribution thus obtained to calculate counterfactual measures of wage 
inequality, to finally decompose differences in wage inequality between two countries according to 
their differences in observed characteristics, the returns to the characteristics and unobserved factors 
(for more details, see Juhn et al., 1993 and Blau and Kahn, 1996, 2005). Yet, an important drawback 
of this technique consists of that the decomposition of international differences in inequality in the 
contribution of cross-country differences in coefficients, characteristics and unobserved factors is 
solely valid at an aggregate level. In contrast, the Yun (2006) technique allows to break down 
international differences in wage inequality into the detailed contribution of cross-country 
differences in coefficients and characteristics of each variable (plus the effect of differences in the 
aggregate effect of unobserved factors). Thus, in short, this unified methodology allows to avoid the 
main shortcomings of both the Fields (2003) technique (namely, that the gross contribution of each 
separate factor to international differences in inequality can not be released in separate effects 
associated to prices and endowments) and the Juhn et al. (1993) technique (that is, that although 
international differences in the inequality can be broken down in the contribution of coefficients, 
measured characteristics and residuals, the decomposition is solely valid at an aggregate level for all 
the explanatory variables, so that it does not permit to disaggregate the different components into 
the detailed effect of each factor). As a consequence, it offers a more complete vision of the origin of 
international differences in wage inequality. (On the other hand, note that a limitation of this method 
is that it is exclusively applicable to the variance of log-wages.)  
To implement this technique, in order to decompose differences in wage inequality between 
countries A and B, the following wage function is estimated separately for the two countries:  
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i εβXw +=                          (7) 
where superscripts A and B correspond to countries A and B, respectively; ciw  corresponds to the 
logarithm of the gross hourly wage of worker i in country c (c=A, B); ciX  is a vector of explanatory 
variables (including a constant term); cβ  is the parameter vector estimated for country c; and ciε  is an 
individual random error term. 
After the separate estimation of equations (6) and (7), the next step of the technique consists 
of the estimation of the following auxiliary regression, in which wage returns estimated for country A 
with equation (6) are substituted by those estimated for country B with equation (7): 
ABA εβXw +=*                                  (8) 
Then, the relative weight factors in global wage inequality of each variable are calculated for 
both actual wages and counterfactual wages constructed with the auxiliary regression given by 
equation (8). From such factors, the difference between countries A and B in the variance of the log-
wages is decomposed of the following form:10 
∑∑ = ∗= ∗ −+−=−−−=− Kk BBkkKk kAAkBABA σSσSσSσSσσσσσσ 1 2,2*,1 2*,2,22*2*222 )()()()(                       (9) 
where 2*σ  is the variance of counterfactual log-wages, the first K-1 factors correspond to the 
exogenous variables and factor K correspond to the residual, with its coefficient of value one 
(alternately put, AKβ =
B
Kβ =1).   
In order to easily identify the characteristics, coefficients and wage residuals effects, equation 
(9) can be expressed alternatively in the following manner: 
      )()()()()( 22
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BA εε
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K
k kAAkBABA
σσσSσSσSσSσσσσσσ −+−+−=−−−=− ∑∑ = ∗= ∗             (10) 
where the first and second terms of the right-hand side of the equation correspond to the sums of 
the effects of inter-country differences in returns and characteristics, respectively, and the third term 
captures the residual effect. 
 
                                                 
10 In order to carry out the full Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition an alternative auxiliary regression should be calculated 
replacing both wage returns and characteristics of country A in equation (6) by those of country B (that is, 
ABB εβXw +=** ). Thus, if wage inequality is measured by Ic, and I* and I** are the values of the same measure of wage 
inequality in the case of the previous counterfactual distributions, inter-country differences in wage inequalities between 
countries A and B could be expressed in terms of differences in returns, characteristics and unobserved factors as 
)()()()( ****** BABA IIIIIIII −+−+−=− . Yet, in order to develop the Yun (2006) technique it is not necessary to calculate 
this alternative auxiliary regression, as long as the effect of residuals is already measured by )( 2,
2
, BBKAAK σSσS − , which is equal 
to )( 2,
2
*, BBKK σSσS −∗ , given that )( 2*,2, σSσS KAAK ∗−  equals zero. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Decomposing within-country levels of wage inequality 
 Table 2 reports the results of the within-country decompositions of wage inequality, obtained by 
applying the Fields (2003) decomposition to alternative specifications of equation (1). In order to ensure 
cross-country comparability of the empirical evidence, these specifications are similar for all the 
countries in the sample. The results in columns labelled Model 1 correspond to the use of a 
parsimonious specification where explanatory variables are individual characteristics. These individual 
controls comprise a gender indicator and a set of traditional human capital variables that proxy 
productivity endowments: the highest level of education reached by the individual (six levels are 
considered); age and its squared term (as a proxy for experience) and the time spent with the current 
employer and its squared term. Specification for Model 2 adds detailed controls for job characteristics 
(concretely, dummies for 27 major occupational groups and indicators for a permanent contract and a 
full-time job) and workplace characteristics.11 These are indicators for industry (55 dummies; 47 for 
Norway, Latvia, Italy and Portugal); the type of financial control (a dummy for fully publicly owned 
firms); size (five dummies) and a set of characteristics of the workplace labour force (specifically, the 
ratio to all employees in the wokplace of women, low- and high-educated workers -as defined as those 
workers with lower than upper-secondary and with tertiary education, respectively- and the average age 
and tenure).12  
The contribution of each variable to wage inequality in Table 2 is measured by its relative 
factor inequality weight Sj. In order to interpret these results, let us notice that the joint effect of a set 
of related variables (as, for instance, age and its squared term or industry dummies) is computed by 
aggregating the relevant separate factors. 
Results arising from Model 1 suggest prima facie that population heterogeneity accounts for a 
broad portion of wage inequality in every European economy. Therefore, individual characteristics 
explain from 18.5% of total inequality in Latvia to 55.3% in the Netherlands, with an unweighted 
average for all nine countries of 36.6% (see final columns of Table 2). Yet, outcomes of Model 2 
reveal that a significant part of the effect of individual factors arises from the uneven distribution 
across jobs and firms of workers with different characteristics. Thus, the explanatory power of 
                                                 
11 Note that, in order to employ a specification of wage equation (1) similar for all countries, workplace characteristics are 
used as controls instead of workplace effects. The estimated earning functions for the fully specified Model 2 are 
reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The general econometric results are fairly standard, so they are not discussed.   
12 Many of these workplace characteristics are usual controls in empirical analyses on wage determination. Yet, let us 
notice, specifically, that the set of characteristics of the workplace labour force has been included providing the evidence 
that a higher presence of women in a firm depresses overall wages (Bayard et al., 2003 and Amuedo-Dorantes and De la 
Rica, 2006) and that the average human capital endowment of a firm’s workforce affects the individual wages of all its 
workers, due plausibly to human capital externalities, such as productive complementarities and knowledge diffusion 
(Battu et al., 2003). 
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individual characteristics on total wage inequality diminishes significantly in almost every case (the 
unweighted average effect of individual factors in Model 2 is 17.2%, although in the Netherlands 
they still explain 38.1% of total inequality). The decrease is particularly noticeable as regards 
education, an element whose actual impact on total wage inequality lies in between 1.9% in Spain and 
13.7 in the Netherlands (with an unweighted average of 6.5%), which contrasts with usual 
considerations on its outstanding influence on wage inequality (see, for instance, Peracchi, 2006). 
Overall, this evidence reveals that although individual characteristics play a part in shaping wage 
inequality, in all European countries most of wage dispersion occurs among workers who are 
identical by measured skill and other observed individual characteristics. An additional point to note 
is that noteworthy international heterogeneity is observed with reference to both the total impact of 
individual characteristics and the specific effect of each individual factor. As a matter of fact, in the 
Netherlands individual characteristics explain 38.1% of wage inequality and the highest impact of a 
single individual factor corresponds to age (19.1%), whereas in Latvia these factors explain 6% of 
total inequality and age has a negligible impact on inequality. 
In turn, job and workplace characteristics explain in general an outstanding portion of wage 
inequality in every case: their joint influence goes from 24.3% of total inequality in the Netherlands 
to 52.8% in Portugal. Moreover, it is much more important than that of individual factors for almost 
all the countries in the sample so that, aside of the Netherlands, the explanatory power of these 
factors is several times that of individual factors. Consequently, job and workplace characteristics 
explain 21.1% and 18.7% of total within-country wage inequality on average, whereas, as noted 
before, the unweighted average effect of individual factors in Model 2 is 17.2%. 
As regards specific job characteristics, the impact of occupation is considerable, given that it 
explains between 9% of total inequality in Latvia and 27.4% in Lithuania (the unweighted average for 
the nine countries is 19.7%), whereas the type of contract and the type of job exert just a minor 
influence on wage inequality. Concerning workplace characteristics, the main observed influence 
corresponds to industry (inter-industry wage differentials explain between 3.1% of total inequality in 
Lithuania and 15% in Slovakia, with an unweighted average of 8.0%); to the composition of the 
workforce (the joint effect of related variables is in the range between 4% of total inequality in Italy 
and Lithuania to 10.5% in the Czech Republic, with an unweighted average of 7.3%) and, although 
only in some countries, to size (it explains around 4-5% of wage inequality in Spain, Italy Portugal, 
Lithuania and Latvia, but has a negligible impact in the remaining countries). 
An additional point of concern is that Model 2 picks up a very significant portion of total 
wage variability in all the countries. This portion is in the range between 39.2% in Latvia and 70% in 
Portugal, although the model tends to explain in general the bulk of wage inequality in European 
 17
 
countries (the unweighted average is 57.0%).13 When workplace effects are considered in the 
specification of wage equation (1) instead of workplace attributes, the portion of wage inequality 
explained increases in every country (the unweighted average is 72.2%: see last row of Table 2).14 Yet, 
whereas the increase is roughly moderate in Norway, Slovakia and the Netherlands, it is somewhat 
more important in the Czech Republic, Italy and Portugal, and substantial in Spain, Lithuania and 
Latvia (in these last two countries the portion of wage inequality explained actually increases from 
49.3% to 70.2% and from 39.2% to 77.2%, respectively). Overall, this finding suggests that although 
the set of workplace indicators employed in the empirical analysis allows to partially control for the 
influence of workplaces on wages, there are unobserved workplace characteristics that affect wages 
in a significant manner which are not possible to control for with information on workplaces 
available in ESES samples.15 This result is consistent with the fact that wage differences between 
firms for similar workers can actually arise from very different grounds as, inter alia, the presence of 
limited or asymmetric information, firm-specific human capital or compensation policies, 
compensating wage differentials, efficiency wages or rent-sharing (for more details, see Groshen, 
1991).16 
 Overall, obtained evidence shows that total wage inequality is generally more strongly associated 
in every European country to workplace and job attributes, so that workforce characteristics play a less 
influential part. Yet, it also reveals the influence in wage inequality of individual, job and workplace 
characteristics displays a significant international heterogeneity in our set of European countries, which 
implies that there is ample room for cross-country differences in these factors playing a part in shaping 
international differences in inequality. An in-depth analysis of this issue is carried out in the next sub-
section of the study. 
                                                 
13 As stressed in the previous section, these values coincide with the unadjusted coefficients of determination of the regression 
of wage equations. These are very similar, indeed, to the adjusted coefficients of determination (see Table A.1 of the 
Appendix). 
14 For technical reasons regarding the remote access to the ESES microdata, it has not been possible to carry out the full 
Fields (2003) decomposition for the model with workplace effects. Yet, as long as the aggregate explanatory power of all 
individual factors in this decomposition coincides with the unadjusted coefficient of determination of the regression of 
the relevant wage equation, it has been possible to estimate it by regressing equation (1) with a set of workplace effects. 
Given the result of the Hausman's contrast, they have been estimated as fixed effects for all the countries. 
15 Let us notice that additional inclusion of country-specific indicators on the type of collective agreement covering the 
workplace for countries where that information is available increases just very slightly the explained part of wage 
inequality in these countries. These results are available from the author on request. 
16 Moreover, it must be considered that, given that it is not possible to identify these effects in ESES cross-section 
microdata, workplace specific effects also capture unobservable individual and individual-firm match effects and that not 
controlling for them can be misleading. Existing evidence for several countries suggests that unobserved individual 
effects tend in general to be weakly correlated with workplace specific effects (see Goux and Maurin, 1999, Abowd et al., 
2001 and the review in Lane, 2008). On the other hand, the findings by Woodcock (2007) suggest that even though 
match effects make a negligible contribution to observed inter-industry or male-female earnings differentials, they are 
important for correcting bias in estimated person and firm effects. In particular, according to the evidence in this study, 
the dispersion of firm effects in the United States is slightly higher when match effects are controlled for.  
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4.2. Decomposing international differences in wage inequality 
The results of applying the Fields (2003) technique to break down the contribution of 
explanatory factors to international differences in wage inequality as measured by the variance of log-
wages can be found in Table 3 (summary results) and Table 4 (full results of pairwise country 
comparisons).17 These tables show, in turn, the results obtained with two specifications of wage 
equation (1) analogous to previous parsimonious Model 1 with individual controls and Model 2 
comprising also workplace and job characteristics. Including these later indicators is desirable in 
order to control for the effect of differences across countries in job and workplace mix in measuring 
the impact of individual factors on differences in wage inequality. However, let us notice that, as Blau 
and Kahn (2005) argue, these factors may affect wages both directly, holding job and workplace 
constant, and indirectly, through their effect on representation in higher-paying workplaces and jobs. 
Thus, regressions including job and workplace variables could not be illustrative of the total effect of 
these variables. For that reason, we focus on models that, in turn, include and exclude these 
variables. 
The first two columns of Table 3 comprise the average results of the decomposition of 
international differences in wage inequality for all the possible pairwise comparisons of the nine 
countries in the sample.18 The average international difference in wage inequality for the nine 
countries in the sample is of 0.144 points, which amounts to 50.3% of the average within-country 
level of wage inequality of 0.286 points and is, thus, substantial. Results from Model 1 reveal that 
differences in individual characteristics explain on average 0.031 points of the average international 
difference in wage inequality of 0.144 points, being particularly important the effect of education 
(0.024) and tenure (0.012). Yet, average results are very influenced by the particular findings of the 
pairwise comparisons that comprise either Latvia or Lithuania, two countries where the effect of 
individual characteristics on wages is particularly low and that of unobserved factors is specially high. 
Thus, if Latvia and Lithuania are excluded (see the results in last two columns of Table 3), the 
average portion of international differences in wage inequality explained by workforce heterogeneity 
becomes much more significant: cross-country differences in individual observed characteristics 
explain in this case the bulk (0.054 points) of international differences in wage inequality (0.093), 
whereas the unexplained part (0.039) is comparatively less important.  
                                                 
17 Table 4 contains results obtained grouping individual, job- and workplace-related factors. More detailed results 
comprising the effect of all individual explanatory factors for each pairwise country comparison are available from the 
author on request. 
18 For each pair of countries the comparison where the difference in wage inequality is positive has been used in the 
analysis. The total amount of comparisons is, thus, 36.  
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Results from fully specified Model 2 reveal, nevertheless, that when job and workplace 
characteristics are also taken into consideration the influence of individual factors diminishes 
considerably, so that job and workplace characteristics are comparatively more influential in shaping 
international differences in wage inequality. Hence, heterogeneity in individual, job and workplace 
attributes explain on average 0.004, 0.023 and 0.032 points of a total average difference of 0.141 
(0.019, 0.021 and 0.026 of a total difference of 0.093 if Latvia and Lithuania are excluded of the 
analysis), whereas unobserved factors explain 0.084 points (0.027 without Latvia and Lithuania). 
Therefore, a sizeable portion of international differences in inequality is generally explained, though 
very specially when pairwise comparisons of Latvia and Lithuania are not considered. Also of 
concern is the effect of certain specific individual factors in shaping international differences in wage 
inequality: it should be stressed the particularly low explanatory power of cross-country differences 
in inequality of education (0.003), and that the more influential job and firm attributes are occupation 
(0.021), industry (0.005), size (0.009) and workforce composition (0.016). 
Prior evidence suggests, overall, that in most cases workplace characteristics are a more 
important origin of international differences in inequality than individual and job-related factors. This 
feature is more clean-cut from the results of certain specific pairwise comparisons, yet. First panel of 
Table 4 reports all the pairwise comparisons of Latvia, the country in the sample with the highest 
wage inequality, with the remaining countries. In every case, workplace-related factors are the origin 
of a sizeable higher wage inequality in Latvia relative to any other European country. Hence, on 
average they generate a higher inequality of 0.074 points in Latvia (with a maximum of 0.101 points 
relative to Norway, the country in the sample with the lowest wage inequality), whereas job-related 
factors have an average negligible impact on inequality (-0.004) and workforce heterogeneity (-0.013) 
ceteris paribus would actually generate a lower inequality in Latvia relative to other European countries. 
Although a somewhat different evidence is found for Lithuania (job-related factors are the main 
identified origin of the comparatively high wage inequality in this country and workplace 
characteristics play an almost negligible part), quite similar results are observed when comparing 
Portugal, another European country with a remarkably dispersed wage structure, with those 
countries with a lower inequality (i.e. all the remaining countries except for Latvia and Lithuania). In 
this case, workplace-related factors are the origin of an average higher inequality in Portugal of 0.068 
points, an effect which is roughly similar to the joint effect of workforce heterogeneity (0.020) and 
job-related factors (0.050). On the other hand, the evidence from the pairwise comparisons of the 
countries with the lowest inequality in the sample is highly parallel: when comparing with countries 
with a higher wage inequality, workplace-related factors are on average the origin of a sizeable lower 
inequality in Norway, Italy and the Czech Republic (-0.040, -0.030 and -0.033 points, respectively), 
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whereas the effect of workforce heterogeneity (-0.017, -0.019 and -0.013) and job-related factors (-
0.025, -0.029 and -0.020) is somewhat less important when explaining their lower wage inequality 
relative to other European countries. 
The results of applying the unified technique developed by Yun (2006) to comprehensively 
evaluate the price and quantity effects of individual explanatory factors to international differences in 
wage inequality can be found in Table 5 (summary results) and Table 6 (full results of pairwise 
comparisons). It must be stressed that, for a question of space, the results from the decomposition 
of international differences in wage inequality for all the possible pairwise comparisons of the nine 
countries in the sample correspond just to those from Model 2.19  
Evidence in Table 5 shows that the aggregate effect of cross-country differences in the 
endowment of observed characteristics explains on average 0.024 points of the average international 
difference in inequality (0.144), so that differences in returns explain a higher portion (0.036 points) 
of the total effect of observed characteristics in shaping international differences in wage inequality 
(0.060). Interestingly, the most important influence corresponds to differences in the rewards to 
workplace characteristics (with a joint effect of 0.033), so that they have a higher impact on 
international differences in wage inequality than differences in endowments of workplace 
characteristics, whose influence is almost negligible (-0.001). This result suggests that international 
differences in inter-firm wage differentials (which, as noted previously, are strongly correlated with 
global wage inequality across countries) are mostly driven by differences in returns, instead of by 
differences in characteristics of workplaces. 
These findings are, again, particularly clean-cut from the results for the countries with the 
comparatively highest and lowest wage inequality in the sample (Table 6). Thus, differences in 
endowments of characteristics would be in general the origin of a slightly higher inequality in Latvia 
relative to the other countries (the average effect is of 0.002), which actually contrasts with the 
significantly higher inequality displayed by this country (0.273), whose main identified origin is the 
particularly way observed characteristics are rewarded there (0.054), very specially as regards 
workplace characteristics (0.086). In a similar vein, other things remaining equal, differences in 
endowments of characteristics would cause a comparatively higher inequality in Norway (0.034), so 
that the relatively lower inequality of this country (-0.169) is basically explained by differences in 
rewards to characteristics (-0.116), playing differences in workplace characteristics also an influential 
role in this case (-0.049). 
                                                 
19 Again, for each pair of countries the comparison where the difference in wage inequality is positive has been 
considered. The total amount of comparisons is 36. Let us notice that the results from the pairwise comparisons with the 
Yun (2006) decomposition may be sensitive to the particular order of the countries.  
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5. Conclusions 
This study has examined the origin of international differences in wage inequality in Europe. 
Wage inequality exhibits a very important heterogeneity across European countries and, for that 
reason, the examination of the origin of international differences in wage inequality in a set of nine 
representative European economies proves particularly informative. The research has been 
conducted on the basis of harmonized microdata drawn from a unique international matched 
employer-employee dataset, the European Structure of Earnings Survey. This survey is conducted in 
a significant number of European countries according to a common methodology so that the 
availability of this excellent source of strictly comparable data allows to obtain a full accounting of 
the effect of workforce, job- and firm-related factors on wage inequality and to explain a sizeable 
portion of international differences in wage inequality. This is a main advantage relative to previous 
studies on the origin of international differences in wage inequality, essentially based on microdata 
with rather limited information on significant wage-determining characteristics of workplaces and 
jobs, whose findings suggest that residual inequality with an unknown origin explain the bulk of 
cross-country differences in earnings inequality. By allowing to identify in the empirical analysis the 
part played in shaping wage inequality by a comprehensive set of factors, the use of international 
matched employer-employee data permits, thus, to shed additional light on the origin of international 
differences in wage inequality.  
A major finding of the study is that global wage inequality is strongly correlated across 
European countries with the magnitude of inter-firm wage differentials, which suggests that 
workplaces play a substantial role in shaping wage inequality. Consistent with this, obtained evidence 
shows that workplace and job attributes are in general outstanding factors in the explanation of 
within-country wage inequality in all European countries and, conversely, that population 
heterogeneity plays a somewhat less significant part. This result suggests that most of wage 
dispersion inside European economies occurs among workers who are identical by measured skill 
and other individual characteristics and that a significant part of the effect of individual factors on 
wage inequality arises from the uneven distribution across workplaces and jobs of workers with 
different characteristics. From a policy perspective, these overall findings imply that public policy 
targeted at affecting firm heterogeneity can influence earnings distribution as much as interventions 
in fields such as education and training.  
 Obtained evidence reveals, on the whole, that European countries exhibit considerably different 
wage structures: they differ significantly not only in the extent of wage inequality, but also in the relative 
influence of factors shaping wage inequality. Consequently, results obtained in the empirical analysis 
 22
 
show that the relative impacts of workplace, individual and job characteristics on wage inequality display 
a significant international heterogeneity and, accordingly, that these factors play a significant part in 
shaping international differences in inequality. Results from overall pairwise country comparisons 
suggest, in particular, that job and, very specially, workplace characteristics are more influential than 
individual characteristics in shaping international differences in wage inequality.  
 Finally, a remarkable result of the study is that differences in returns to characteristics explain 
more the influence of observed characteristics in shaping international differences in wage inequality 
than cross-country differences in endowments, which are less influential. This finding suggests that the 
explanation for cross-country differences in wage inequality lies to a lesser extent in the distribution of 
skills or job and workplace mix and more in the mechanism by which different pay systems produce 
dispersion among otherwise observationally similar workers, jobs and workplaces. Obtained evidence 
shows, moreover, that differences in the rewards to workplace characteristics play a particularly 
significant part in the explanation of international differences in wage inequality. This finding suggest, on 
the one hand, that international differences in inter-firm wage differentials, a major origin of 
international differences in global wage inequality, are not mostly driven by heterogeneity in firm 
populations but by differences in returns to firm characteristics. On the other hand, although it is 
beyond the scope of this research to assess to what extent the explanation of international differences in 
wage inequality rest on labour institutions such as collective bargaining, it is somewhat consistent, in the 
same vein that overall obtained evidence, with the hypothesis that there is more margin to inter-firm 
wage differentials in countries with decentralized wage-setting systems.  
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Table 1 
Wage dispersion and wage-setting institutions. ESES 2002. 
 Norway Italy 
Czech 
Republic Netherlands Slovakia Spain Portugal Lithuania Latvia 
Hourly wage dispersion measures          
90-10 log differential 0.891 1.002 1.060 1.139 1.190 1.289 1.545 1.591  1.786 
50-10 log differential 0.316 0.398 0.517 0.566 0.561 0.493 0.576 0.747  0.588 
90-50 log differential 0.575 0.604 0.544 0.573 0.629 0.795 0.969 0.844  1.198 
Variance of logarithms 0.136 0.175 0.196 0.254 0.252 0.274 0.376 0.385  0.529 
Mean log deviation  0.077 0.104 0.116 0.123 0.162 0.158 0.225 0.217  0.442 
Gini Index 0.217 0.252 0.263 0.262 0.308 0.315 0.376 0.367  0.456 
Wage-setting institutions          
Union affiliation rate (%)a 54 35 30 27 36 15 24 15 30 
Collective bargaining coverage rate (%)b 70 80 25 80 50 80 80 14 20 
Collective bargaining coordinationc 4.5 4 1 4 2 3 4 1.5 1.5 
Collective bargaining centralizationd 4.5 2 1 3 2 3 4 1 1 
Statutory minimum wage/Average gross wagee - - 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.35 
Regulatory mechanism of low-wagesf Collective bargaining 
Collective 
bargaining 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum 
wage 
Workplace effects standard deviation           
Unadjusted 0.218 0.311 0.284 0.320 0.276 0.421 0.497 0.421  0.604 
Adjusted by individual and job controls 0.126 0.243 0.228 0.167 0.254 0.302 0.334 0.368  0.566 
Wage residual standard deviation           
Adjusted by workplace effects 0.298 0.279 0.340 0.389 0.419 0.312 0.359 0.460  0.406 
Adjusted by workplace effects and individual and job controls 0.213 0.207 0.233 0.278 0.324 0.236 0.263 0.339  0.347 
a OECD (2004): 2001 for the Czech Republic and 2000 for the other countries. EIRO (2002) for Latvia and Lithuania. 
b Eurostat (2005). 
c OECD (2004). Collective bargaining coordination in 1995-2000. 1=low coordination; 5=high coordination. A value of 1.5 has been assigned to Latvia and Lithuania on the basis of the information of 
European Commission (2004). 
d OECD (2004). Predominant level of collective bargaining in 1995-2000. 1=company and plant level predominant; 2=combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of employees 
covered by company bargains; 3=industry-level predominant; 4=predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements; 5=central-level agreements of overriding importance. EIRO 
(2002) for Latvia and Lithuania. 
e EIRO (2005). 2002 (2004 for Spain). For Portugal, Statutory minimum wage/Median gross wage. 
f Eurostat (2003). 
Notes:  90-10, 50-10 and 90-50 log differentials are the wage differentials between the 90th-10th, 50th-10th and 90th-10th deciles of the log hourly wage distribution. The unadjusted and adjusted dispersion of 
workplace wage differentials are the standard deviation of a set of workplace fixed effects estimated with two extended specifications of wage equation (1). These include, in turn, no other additional control 
and a full set of individual and job controls (gender, education, age and its squared term, tenure in the firm and its squared term, type of contract, full-time/part-time job and occupation) 
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Table 2 
Fields (2003) decomposition of within-country levels of wage inequality. ESES 2002. 
 Norway Italy Czech Republic Netherlands Slovakia Spain Portugal Lithuania Latvia Average 
 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 
Aggregate 0.406 0.620 0.348 0.560 0.349 0.613 0.553 0.625 0.293 0.546 0.407 0.577 0.497 0.700 0.252 0.493 0.185 0.392 0.366 0.570 
Individual characteristics 0.406 0.213 0.348 0.164 0.349 0.187 0.553 0.381 0.293 0.143 0.407 0.158 0.497 0.172 0.252 0.070 0.185 0.060 0.366 0.172 
Gender  0.057  0.031  0.030  0.025 0.076  0.062  0.034  0.023 0.090  0.052  0.042  0.027 0.031 0.016  0.008  0.005  0.010  0.005  0.042  0.027 
Education  0.180  0.071  0.194  0.059 0.217  0.089  0.238  0.137 0.159  0.056  0.166  0.019 0.325  0.077  0.201  0.046  0.109  0.029  0.199  0.065 
Tenure  0.017  0.014  0.057  0.028 0.049  0.026  0.054  0.030 0.037  0.021  0.147  0.075 0.073  0.040  0.042  0.018  0.067  0.026  0.060  0.031 
Age  0.152  0.097  0.067  0.052 0.007  0.010  0.227  0.191 0.008  0.015  0.051  0.037 0.069  0.040  0.000  0.001 -0.002  0.000  0.064  0.049 
Job characteristics - 0.260 - 0.201 - 0.243 - 0.151 - 0.164 - 0.236 - 0.249 - 0.289 - 0.103 - 0.211 
Type of contract -  0.003 -  0.002 -  0.013 -  0.025 -  0.001 -  0.016 -  0.009 -  0.001 -  0.000 -  0.008 
Full-time/Part-time -  0.018 - -0.002 -  0.000 -  0.006 -  0.006 - -0.002 -  0.000 -  0.014 -  0.011 -  0.006 
Occupation -  0.240 -  0.201 -  0.230 -  0.120 -  0.157 -  0.223 -  0.240 -  0.274 -  0.092 -  0.197 
Firm characteristics - 0.148 - 0.195 - 0.183 - 0.092 - 0.238 - 0.182 - 0.279 - 0.134 - 0.229 - 0.187 
Industry -  0.094 -  0.102 -  0.066 -  0.051 -  0.150 -  0.046 -  0.133 -  0.031 -  0.050 -  0.080 
Type of financial control - -0.002 -  0.001 -  0.003 - -0.008 -  0.009 -  0.000 -  0.012 -  0.021 -  0.012 -  0.005 
Size -  0.005 -  0.053 -  0.009 - -0.001 -  0.011 -  0.045 -  0.051 -  0.035 -  0.049 -  0.029 
Share of females -  0.003 -  0.004 -  0.041 -  0.008 -  0.060 -  0.011 -  0.004 -  0.001 -  0.002 -  0.015 
Average age - -0.003 -  0.006 - -0.008 -  0.005 - -0.004 -  0.018 - -0.009 -  0.007 -  0.025 -  0.004 
Average tenure -  0.004 -  0.001 -  0.003 -  0.002 -  0.005 -  0.011 -  0.008 - -0.002 -  0.000 -  0.004 
Share of high-educated  -  0.040 -  0.012 -  0.062 -  0.008 -  0.007 -  0.027 -  0.034 -  0.042 -  0.094 -  0.036 
Share of low-educated  -  0.006 -  0.018 -  0.007 -  0.027 -  0.003 -  0.023 -  0.047 - -0.001 - -0.003 -  0.014 
Wage residuals 0.594 0.380 0.652 0.440 0.651 0.387 0.447 0.375 0.707 0.454 0.593 0.423 0.503 0.300 0.748 0.507 0.816 0.608 0.634 0.430 
Pro memoria                     
Aggregate with workplace effects 
and individual and job controls - 0.667 - 0.754 - 0.720 - 0.692 - 0.584 - 0.795 - 0.816 - 0.702 - 0.772 - 0.722 
Notes: The table contains factors t
kS  as expressed in equation (3).  
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Table 3 
Fields (2003) decomposition of international differences in wage inequality. 
Summary results. ESES 2002. 
 
Average of all 
pairwise 
comparisons 
Average of all 
pairwise 
comparisons 
(without Latvia and 
Lithuania) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Aggregate 0.031 0.060 0.054 0.066 
Individual characteristics 0.031 0.004 0.054 0.019 
Gender -0.002 -0.002  0.002  0.001 
Education  0.024  0.003  0.032  0.006 
Tenure  0.012  0.005  0.013  0.007 
Age -0.003 -0.003  0.007  0.005 
Job characteristics - 0.023 - 0.021 
Type of contract -  0.000 -  0.002 
Full-time/Part-time -  0.002 - -0.001 
Occupation -  0.021 -  0.020 
Workplace characteristics - 0.032 - 0.026 
Industry -  0.005 -  0.010 
Type of financial control -  0.003 -  0.001 
Size -  0.009 -  0.006 
Workforce composition -  0.016 -  0.010 
Wage residuals 0.113 0.084 0.039 0.027 
Difference in inequality 0.144 0.093 
Notes: Table contains factors Πk(I)  as expressed in equation (5). The average values in the 
table have been calculated from all the pairwise comparisons of the nine countries in the 
sample.   
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Table 4 
Fields (2003) decomposition of international differences in wage inequality. Full results. ESES 2002. 
 
Norway Italy Czech Republic Netherlands Slovakia Spain Portugal Lithuania Latvia Average All comparisons
Average when 
more inequality in 
reference country
Average when 
less inequality in 
reference country 
Reference: Latvia Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 
Aggregate 0.042 0.123 0.037 0.110 0.029 0.087 -0.043 0.049 0.024 0.070 -0.014 0.049 -0.089 -0.056 0.001 0.018 - - -0.002 0.056 -0.002 0.056 - - 
Individual characteristics 0.042 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.029 -0.005 -0.043 -0.065 0.024 -0.004 -0.014 -0.011 -0.089 -0.033 0.001 0.005 - - -0.002 -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 - - 
Job characteristics - 0.019 - 0.019 - 0.007 - 0.016 - 0.013 - -0.010 - -0.039 - -0.057 - - - -0.004 - -0.004 - - 
Workplace characteristics - 0.101 - 0.087 - 0.085 - 0.098 - 0.061 - 0.071 - 0.016 - 0.070 - - - 0.074 - 0.074 - - 
Wage residuals 0.351 0.270 0.317 0.244 0.304 0.246 0.318 0.226 0.253 0.207 0.269 0.206  0.242 0.209 0.143 0.126 - - 0.275 0.217 0.275 0.217 - - 
Difference in inequality 0.393 0.354 0.333 0.275 0.277 0.255 0.153 0.144 - 0.273 0.273 - 
Reference: Lithuania     - -   
Aggregate 0.042 0.105 0.036 0.092 0.029 0.070 -0.044 0.031 0.023 0.052 -0.015 0.032 -0.090 -0.073 - - -0.001 -0.018 -0.003 0.036 -0.003 0.044 -0.001 -0.018 
Individual characteristics 0.042 -0.002 0.036 -0.002 0.029 -0.010 -0.044 -0.070 0.023 -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.090 -0.038 - - -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.019 -0.003 -0.021 -0.001 -0.005 
Job characteristics - 0.076 - 0.076 - 0.064 - 0.073 - 0.070 - 0.047 - 0.018 - - - 0.057 - 0.060 - 0.061 - 0.057 
Workplace characteristics - 0.031 - 0.017 - 0.016 - 0.028 - -0.009 - 0.001 - -0.053 - - - -0.070 - -0.005 - 0.004 - -0.070 
Wage residuals 0.207 0.144 0.174 0.118 0.160 0.119 0.175 0.100 0.110 0.081 0.126 0.079 0.099 0.083 - -0.143 -0.126 0.114 0.075 0.150 0.103 -0.143 -0.126 
Difference in inequality 0.249 0.210 0.189 0.131 0.133 0.111 0.009 - -0.144 0.111 0.147 -0.144 
Reference: Portugal       
Aggregate 0.132 0.179 0.126 0.165 0.119 0.143 0.047 0.105 0.113 0.126 0.076 0.105 - - 0.090 0.073 0.089 0.056 0.099 0.119 0.102 0.137 0.090 0.065 
Individual characteristics 0.132 0.036 0.126 0.036 0.119 0.028 0.047 -0.032 0.113 0.029 0.076 0.021 - - 0.090 0.038 0.089 0.033 0.099 0.024 0.102 0.020 0.090 0.036 
Job characteristics - 0.058 - 0.058 - 0.046 - 0.055 - 0.052 - 0.029 - - - -0.018 - 0.039 - 0.040 - 0.050 - 0.011 
Workplace characteristics - 0.085 - 0.071 - 0.069 - 0.081 - 0.045 - 0.055 - - - 0.053 - -0.016 - 0.055 - 0.068 - 0.019 
Wage residuals 0.108 0.061 0.075 0.036 0.061 0.037 0.076 0.018 0.011 -0.002 0.026 -0.003 - - -0.099 -0.083 -0.242 -0.209 0.002 -0.018 0.060 0.025 -0.171 -0.146 
Difference in inequality 0.240 0.201 0.180 0.122 0.124 0.102 - -0.009 -0.153 0.101 0.162 -0.081 
Reference: Spain       
Aggregate 0.056 0.074 0.050 0.060 0.043 0.038 -0.029 -0.001 0.037 0.021 - - -0.076 -0.105 0.015 -0.032 0.014 -0.049 0.014 0.001 0.031 0.038 -0.016 -0.062 
Individual characteristics 0.056 0.014 0.050 0.015 0.043 0.007 -0.029 -0.053 0.037 0.007 - - -0.076 -0.021 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.014 -0.001 0.031 -0.002 -0.016 0.002 
Job characteristics - 0.029 - 0.030 - 0.017 - 0.026 - 0.023 - - - -0.029 - -0.047 - 0.010 - 0.007 - 0.025 - -0.022 
Workplace characteristics - 0.030 - 0.016 - 0.014 - 0.027 - -0.010 - - - -0.055 - -0.001 - -0.071 - -0.006 - 0.015 - -0.042 
Wage residuals 0.082 0.064 0.049 0.039 0.035 0.040 0.049 0.021 -0.016 0.001 - - -0.026 0.003 -0.126 -0.079 -0.269 -0.206 -0.028 -0.015 0.040 0.033 -0.140 -0.094 
Difference in inequality 0.138 0.099 0.078 0.020 0.022 - -0.102 -0.111 -0.255 -0.014 0.071 -0.156 
Reference: Slovakia       
Aggregate 0.019 0.053 0.013 0.040 0.006 0.017 -0.067 -0.021 - - -0.037 -0.021 -0.113 -0.126 -0.023 -0.052 -0.024 -0.070 -0.028 -0.023 -0.007 0.022 -0.049 -0.067 
Individual characteristics 0.019 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.067 -0.061 - - -0.037 -0.007 -0.113 -0.029 -0.023 0.009 -0.024 0.004 -0.028 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.049 -0.006 
Job characteristics - 0.006 - 0.006 - -0.006 - 0.003 - - - -0.023 - -0.052 - -0.070 - -0.013 - -0.019 - 0.002 - -0.040 
Workplace characteristics - 0.040 - 0.026 - 0.024 - 0.037 - - - 0.010 - -0.045 - 0.009 - -0.061 - 0.005 - 0.032 - -0.022 
Wage residuals 0.097 0.063 0.064 0.037 0.050 0.039 0.065 0.019 - - 0.016 -0.001 -0.011 0.002 -0.110 -0.081 -0.253 -0.207 -0.010 -0.016 0.069 0.040 -0.090 -0.072 
Difference in inequality 0.116 0.077 0.056 -0.002 - -0.022 -0.124 -0.133 -0.277 -0.039 0.062 -0.139 
Reference: Netherlands       
Aggregate 0.085 0.074 0.080 0.061 0.072 0.038 - - 0.067 0.021 0.029 0.001 -0.047 -0.105 0.044 -0.031 0.043 -0.049 0.047 0.001 0.079 0.058 0.027 -0.033 
Individual characteristics 0.085 0.068 0.080 0.068 0.072 0.060 - - 0.067 0.061 0.029 0.053 -0.047 0.032 0.044 0.070 0.043 0.065 0.047 0.060 0.079 0.065 0.027 0.056 
Job characteristics - 0.003 - 0.003 - -0.009 - - - -0.003 - -0.026 - -0.055 - -0.073 - -0.016 - -0.022 - -0.001 - -0.035 
Workplace characteristics - 0.003 - -0.011 - -0.012 - - - -0.037 - -0.027 - -0.081 - -0.028 - -0.098 - -0.036 - -0.007 - -0.054 
Wage residuals 0.033 0.044 -0.001 0.018 -0.014 0.019 - - -0.065 -0.019 -0.049 -0.021 -0.076 -0.018 -0.175 -0.100 -0.318 -0.226 -0.083 -0.038 0.006 0.027 -0.137 -0.077 
Difference in inequality 0.118 0.079 0.058 - 0.002 -0.020 -0.122 -0.131 -0.275 -0.036 0.085 -0.109 
Reference: Czech Rep.       
Aggregate 0.013 0.036 0.007 0.022 - - -0.072 -0.038 -0.006 -0.017 -0.043 -0.038 -0.119 -0.143 -0.029 -0.070 -0.029 -0.087 -0.035 -0.042 0.010 0.029 -0.050 -0.066 
Individual characteristics 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.008 - - -0.072 -0.060 -0.006 0.001 -0.043 -0.007 -0.119 -0.028 -0.029 0.010 -0.029 0.005 -0.035 -0.008 0.010 0.008 -0.050 -0.013 
Job characteristics - 0.012 - 0.012 - - - 0.009 - 0.006 - -0.017 - -0.046 - -0.064 - -0.007 - -0.012 - 0.012 - -0.020 
Workplace characteristics - 0.016 - 0.002 - - - 0.012 - -0.024 - -0.014 - -0.069 - -0.016 - -0.085 - -0.022 - 0.009 - -0.033 
Wage residuals 0.047 0.024 0.014 -0.001 - - 0.014 -0.019 -0.050 -0.039 -0.035 -0.040 -0.061 -0.037 -0.160 -0.119 -0.304 -0.246 -0.067 -0.060 0.031 0.012 -0.099 -0.083 
Difference in inequality 0.060 0.021 - -0.058 -0.056 -0.078 -0.180 -0.189 -0.333 -0.089 0.041 -0.141 
Reference: Italy       
Aggregate 0.006 0.014 - - -0.007 -0.022 -0.080 -0.061 -0.013 -0.040 -0.050 -0.060 -0.126 -0.165 -0.036 -0.092 -0.037 -0.110 -0.043 -0.067 0.006 0.014 -0.050 -0.079 
Individual characteristics 0.006 0.000 - - -0.007 -0.008 -0.080 -0.068 -0.013 -0.007 -0.050 -0.015 -0.126 -0.036 -0.036 0.002 -0.037 -0.003 -0.043 -0.017 0.006 0.000 -0.050 -0.019 
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Job characteristics - 0.000 - - - -0.012 - -0.003 - -0.006 - -0.030 - -0.058 - -0.076 - -0.019 - -0.026 - 0.000 - -0.029 
Workplace characteristics - 0.014 - - - -0.002 - 0.011 - -0.026 - -0.016 - -0.071 - -0.017 - -0.087 - -0.024 - 0.014 - -0.030 
Wage residuals 0.033 0.026 - - -0.014 0.001 0.001 -0.018 -0.064 -0.037 -0.049 -0.039 -0.075 -0.036 -0.174 -0.118 -0.317 -0.244 -0.082 -0.058 0.033 0.026 -0.099 -0.070 
Difference in inequality 0.039 - -0.021 -0.079 -0.077 -0.099 -0.201 -0.210 -0.354 -0.125 0.039 -0.149 
Reference: Norway       
Aggregate - - -0.006 -0.014 -0.013 -0.036 -0.085 -0.074 -0.019 -0.053 -0.056 -0.074 -0.132 -0.179 -0.042 -0.105 -0.042 -0.123 -0.049 -0.082 - - -0.049 -0.082 
Individual characteristics - - -0.006 0.000 -0.013 -0.008 -0.085 -0.068 -0.019 -0.007 -0.056 -0.014 -0.132 -0.036 -0.042 0.002 -0.042 -0.003 -0.049 -0.017 - - -0.049 -0.017 
Job characteristics - - - 0.000 - -0.012 - -0.003 - -0.006 - -0.029 - -0.058 - -0.076 - -0.019 - -0.025 - - - -0.025 
Workplace characteristics - - - -0.014 - -0.016 - -0.003 - -0.040 - -0.030 - -0.085 - -0.031 - -0.101 - -0.040 - - - -0.040 
Wage residuals - - -0.033 -0.026 -0.047 -0.024 -0.033 -0.044 -0.097 -0.063 -0.082 -0.064 -0.108 -0.061 -0.207 -0.144 -0.351 -0.270 -0.120 -0.087 - - -0.120 -0.087 
Difference in inequality - -0.039 -0.060 -0.118 -0.116 -0.138 -0.240 -0.249 -0.393 -0.169 - -0.169 
Notes: Table contains factors Πk(I)  as expressed in equation (5). 
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Table 5 
Yun (2006) decomposition of international differences in wage inequality. 
Summary results. ESES 2002.  
 
Average of all 
pairwise 
comparisons 
Average of all 
pairwise 
comparisons 
(without Latvia and 
Lithuania) 
 Charac. Returns Charac. Returns 
Aggregate  0.024  0.036  0.034  0.032 
Individual characteristics -0.002  0.007  0.002  0.016 
Gender  0.000 -0.002  0.001  0.000 
Education  0.003  0.000  0.004  0.003 
Tenure -0.002  0.007  0.000  0.007 
Age -0.003  0.002 -0.002  0.007 
Job characteristics  0.027 -0.004  0.025 -0.004 
Type of contract  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Full-time/Part-time  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Occupation  0.027 -0.006  0.025 -0.005 
Workplace characteristics -0.001  0.033  0.006  0.020 
Industry -0.002  0.007  0.000  0.009 
Type of financial control -0.001  0.004  0.000  0.001 
Size -0.002  0.011  0.000  0.006 
Workforce composition  0.003  0.012  0.007  0.003 
Wage residuals 0.084 0.027 
Difference in inequality 0.144 0.093 
Notes: The average values in the table have been calculated from all the pairwise 
comparisons of the nine countries in the sample.   
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Table 6 
Yun (2006) decomposition of international differences in wage inequality. Full results. ESES 2002. 
 
Norway Italy Czech Republic Netherlands Slovakia Spain Portugal Lithuania Latvia Average All comparisons
Average when 
more inequality in 
reference country
Average when 
less inequality in 
reference country 
Reference: Latvia Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.018 0.141  0.128 -0.019 0.061 0.026 -0.078  0.126  0.041 0.029 -0.026 0.075 -0.044 -0.012 -0.050 0.068 - - 0.002 0.054 0.002 0.054 - - 
Individual characteristics -0.009 0.012  0.007 -0.004 0.008 -0.013 -0.048 -0.017  0.022 -0.026 -0.013 0.002 -0.016 -0.017 -0.005 0.010 - - -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 - - 
Job characteristics -0.001 0.020  0.136 -0.116 0.031 -0.024 -0.019  0.035  0.026 -0.013 0.016 -0.027 0.023 -0.062 -0.044 -0.013 - - 0.021 -0.025 0.021 -0.025 - - 
Workplace characteristics -0.008 0.109 -0.014  0.101 0.023 0.062 -0.011  0.108 -0.007 0.068 -0.029 0.100 -0.051 0.067 -0.001 0.071 - - -0.012 0.086 -0.012 0.086 - - 
Wage residuals 0.270   0.244  0.246  0.226  0.207 0.206 0.209 0.126 - 0.217 0.217 -  
Difference in inequality 0.393   0.354  0.333  0.275  0.277 0.255 0.153 0.144 - 0.273 0.273 -  
Reference: Lithuania Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.008 0.114  0.134 -0.042 0.071 -0.002 -0.075  0.106  0.054 -0.001 0.012 0.020 -0.035 -0.039 - - 0.158 -0.176 0.039 -0.003 0.022 0.022 0.158 -0.176 
Individual characteristics -0.008 0.006  0.003 -0.005 0.009 -0.019 -0.049 -0.021  0.002 -0.011 -0.013 -0.003 -0.018 -0.020 - - 0.016 -0.021 -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 0.016 -0.021 
Job characteristics 0.003 0.073  0.143 -0.067 0.037 0.026 -0.011  0.084  0.043 0.027 0.030 0.017 0.034 -0.016 - - 0.022 0.035 0.038 0.022 0.040 0.021 0.022  0.035 
Workplace characteristics -0.003 0.035 -0.013  0.030 0.025 -0.009 -0.016  0.044  0.009 -0.017 -0.005 0.006 -0.050 -0.003 - - 0.120 -0.190 0.008 -0.013 -0.008 0.012 0.120 -0.190 
Wage residuals 0.144   0.118  0.119  0.100  0.081 0.079 0.083 - -0.126 0.075 0.103 -0.126  
Difference in inequality 0.249   0.210  0.189  0.131  0.133 0.111 0.009 - -0.144 0.111 0.147 -0.144  
Reference: Portugal Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.029 0.208  0.123  0.042 0.038 0.105 -0.049  0.154  0.053 0.073 -0.012 0.117 - - -0.023 0.096 0.024 0.032 0.016 0.103 0.021 0.117 0.001  0.064 
Individual characteristics -0.009 0.045  0.016  0.020 0.003 0.025 -0.034  0.002  0.005 0.024 -0.002 0.023 - - -0.001 0.039 0.003 0.030 -0.002 0.026 -0.004 0.023 0.001  0.035 
Job characteristics -0.013 0.072  0.085 -0.027 0.006 0.040 -0.017  0.072  0.009 0.043 -0.014 0.043 - - -0.072 0.054 -0.022 0.062 -0.005 0.045 0.009 0.041 -0.047  0.058 
Workplace characteristics -0.007 0.091  0.022  0.048 0.029 0.040  0.001  0.080  0.039 0.006 0.004 0.051 - - 0.050 0.003 0.044 -0.060 0.023 0.032 0.015 0.053 0.047 -0.029 
Wage residuals 0.061   0.036  0.037  0.018 -0.002 -0.003 - -0.083 -0.209 -0.018 0.025 -0.146  
Difference in inequality 0.240   0.201  0.180  0.122  0.124 0.102 - -0.009 -0.153 0.101 0.162 -0.081  
Reference: Spain Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.001 0.075  0.121 -0.061 0.098 -0.060 -0.018  0.017  0.050 -0.029 - - 0.018 -0.123 -0.003 -0.029 0.104 -0.153 0.046 -0.045 0.050 -0.012 0.040 -0.102 
Individual characteristics -0.001 0.015  0.021 -0.007 0.022 -0.016 -0.017 -0.037  0.022 -0.015 - - 0.005 -0.026 0.009 0.007 0.031 -0.019 0.012 -0.012 0.009 -0.012 0.015 -0.013 
Job characteristics -0.007 0.036  0.097 -0.068 0.022 -0.005 -0.008  0.034  0.012 0.011 - - 0.021 -0.050 -0.040 -0.007 -0.003 0.014 0.012 -0.004 0.023 0.002 -0.007 -0.014 
Workplace characteristics 0.006 0.024  0.002  0.014 0.054 -0.040  0.007  0.020  0.015 -0.025 - - -0.008 -0.047 0.028 -0.029 0.077 -0.148 0.023 -0.029 0.017 -0.001 0.032 -0.075 
Wage residuals 0.064   0.039  0.040  0.021  0.001 - 0.003 -0.079 -0.206 -0.015 0.033 -0.094  
Difference in inequality 0.138   0.099  0.078  0.020  0.022 - -0.102 -0.111 -0.255 -0.014 0.071 -0.156  
Reference: Slovakia Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.033 0.086  0.090 -0.050 -0.012 0.029 -0.084  0.063 - - -0.052 0.032 -0.112 -0.014 -0.088 0.036 -0.034 -0.036 -0.041 0.018 -0.010 0.032 -0.072  0.005 
Individual characteristics -0.010 0.017  0.002  0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.049 -0.012 - - -0.013 0.006 -0.025 -0.004 -0.006 0.016 -0.004 0.008 -0.013 0.005 -0.014 0.003 -0.012  0.007 
Job characteristics -0.012 0.018  0.101 -0.095 -0.003 -0.004 -0.021  0.024 - - -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.039 -0.065 -0.005 -0.014 0.001 -0.005 -0.014 0.016 -0.014 -0.026 -0.013 
Workplace characteristics -0.011 0.051 -0.014  0.040 -0.009 0.033 -0.015  0.051 - - -0.026 0.036 -0.074 0.029 -0.017 0.026 -0.016 -0.045 -0.023 0.028 -0.012 0.044 -0.033  0.012 
Wage residuals 0.063   0.037  0.039  0.019 - -0.001 0.002 -0.081 -0.207 -0.016 0.040 -0.072  
Difference in inequality 0.116   0.077  0.056 -0.002 - -0.022 -0.124 -0.133 -0.277 -0.039 0.062 -0.139  
Reference: Netherlands Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate 0.008 0.067  0.135 -0.074 0.053 -0.015 - -  0.081 -0.060 0.052 -0.051 -0.033 -0.071 0.038 -0.069 0.051 -0.100 0.048 -0.047 0.065 -0.007 0.038 -0.070 
Individual characteristics 0.006 0.062  0.016  0.052 0.018 0.042 - -  0.012 0.049 -0.003 0.056 -0.003 0.035 0.006 0.064 0.006 0.058 0.007 0.052 0.013 0.052 0.004  0.052 
Job characteristics 0.002 0.001  0.124 -0.120 0.026 -0.035 - -  0.055 -0.058 0.044 -0.071 0.023 -0.079 0.034 -0.107 0.043 -0.059 0.044 -0.066 0.051 -0.051 0.040 -0.075 
Workplace characteristics -0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0.009 -0.022 - -  0.014 -0.051 0.010 -0.037 -0.054 -0.028 -0.002 -0.026 0.002 -0.099 -0.003 -0.033 0.001 -0.008 -0.006 -0.048 
Wage residuals 0.044   0.018  0.019 - -0.019 -0.021 -0.018 -0.100 -0.226 -0.038 0.027 -0.077  
Difference in inequality 0.118   0.079  0.058 -  0.002 -0.020 -0.122 -0.131 -0.275 -0.036 0.085 -0.109  
Reference: Czech Rep. Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.033 0.069  0.096 -0.074 - - -0.079  0.041  0.002 -0.020 -0.024 -0.014 -0.099 -0.044 -0.063 -0.007 -0.005 -0.082 -0.026 -0.016 0.032 -0.003 -0.045 -0.021 
Individual characteristics -0.011 0.018  0.002  0.006 - - -0.047 -0.013  0.000 0.001 -0.011 0.004 -0.028 0.000 -0.003 0.013 -0.001 0.006 -0.012 0.004 -0.005 0.012 -0.015  0.002 
Job characteristics -0.011 0.023  0.100 -0.088 - - -0.020  0.029  0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.040 -0.055 -0.009 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.012 0.045 -0.033 -0.015 -0.005 
Workplace characteristics -0.011 0.027 -0.006  0.008 - - -0.012  0.025 -0.002 -0.022 -0.008 -0.006 -0.065 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 0.005 -0.090 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 0.018 -0.014 -0.018 
Wage residuals 0.024  -0.001  - -0.019 -0.039 -0.040 -0.037 -0.119 -0.246 -0.060 0.012 -0.083  
Difference in inequality 0.060   0.021  - -0.058 -0.056 -0.078 -0.180 -0.189 -0.333 -0.102 0.041 -0.149  
Reference: Italy Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate -0.047 0.061 - - -0.010 -0.012 -0.088  0.027  0.007 -0.046 -0.068 0.008 -0.124 -0.041 -0.063 -0.029 -0.063 -0.047 -0.057 -0.010 -0.047 0.061 -0.058 -0.020 
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Individual characteristics -0.014 0.014 - - -0.005 -0.003 -0.054 -0.015  0.008 -0.015 -0.011 -0.004 -0.031 -0.005 -0.007 0.008 -0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.002 -0.014 0.014 -0.015 -0.004 
Job characteristics -0.024 0.024 - - -0.017 0.005 -0.030  0.026 -0.012 0.006 -0.041 0.011 -0.051 -0.008 -0.069 -0.007 -0.032 0.013 -0.035 0.009 -0.024 0.024 -0.036  0.007 
Workplace characteristics -0.009 0.023 - - 0.012 -0.014 -0.005  0.015  0.011 -0.037 -0.017 0.001 -0.042 -0.029 0.013 -0.031 -0.024 -0.063 -0.008 -0.017 -0.009 0.023 -0.007 -0.023 
Wage residuals 0.026  -  0.001 -0.018 -0.037 -0.039 -0.036 -0.118 -0.244 -0.058 0.026 -0.070  
Difference in inequality 0.039  -  -0.021 -0.079 -0.077 -0.099 -0.201 -0.210 -0.354 -0.125 0.039 -0.149  
Reference: Norway Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns Charact. Returns 
Aggregate - -  0.112 -0.126 0.039 -0.075 -0.028 -0.046  0.055 -0.108 0.013 -0.087 -0.052 -0.127 0.065 -0.170 0.065 -0.188 0.034 -0.116 - - 0.034 -0.116 
Individual characteristics - -  0.010 -0.010 0.009 -0.017 -0.020 -0.048  0.009 -0.016 -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.024 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.009 0.000 -0.017 - - 0.000 -0.017 
Job characteristics - -  0.097 -0.096 0.021 -0.033 -0.014  0.011  0.047 -0.052 0.026 -0.056 -0.002 -0.056 -0.013 -0.063 0.032 -0.052 0.024 -0.050 - - 0.024 -0.050 
Workplace characteristics - -  0.005 -0.019 0.009 -0.025  0.006 -0.010 -0.001 -0.039 -0.008 -0.022 -0.038 -0.047 0.073 -0.105 0.026 -0.127 0.009 -0.049 - - 0.009 -0.049 
Wage residuals -  -0.026  -0.024 -0.044 -0.063 -0.064 -0.061 -0.144 -0.270 -0.087 - -0.087  
Difference in inequality -  -0.039  -0.060 -0.118 -0.116 -0.138 -0.240 -0.249 -0.393 -0.169 - -0.169  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1  
Descriptive evidence and regression results. 
 Norway Czech Republic Netherlands Slovakia Spain Portugal Latvia Italy Lithuania 
 Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. Mean Coeff. 
Hourly wage 
(in national currency) 
170.23 
(79.84) - 
 107.44 
(80.05) - 
18.01 
(11.30) - 
110.18 
(47.63) - 
 10.02 
(7.48) - 
7.20 
(6.98) - 
0.98 
(1.84) - 
 11.52 
(86.83) - 
6.57 
(85.88) - 
 
Log hourly wage 5.060 (0.369) - 
 4.560 
(0.443) - 
2.768 
(0.504) - 
4.540 
(0.502) - 
 2.147 
(0.524) - 
1.749 
(0.613) - 
-0.362 
(0.727) - 
 2.341 
(0.418) - 
1.665 
(0.620) - 
 
Female 0.365 -0.088** 0.465 -0.188** 0.507 -0.101** 0.461 -0.169** 0.353 -0.142** 0.380 -0.115** 0.434 -0.088** 0.318 -0.124** 0.539 -0.109** 
Male 0.635 Refer. 0.535 Refer. 0.493 Refer. 0.539 Refer. 0.647 Refer. 0.620 Refer. 0.566 Refer. 0.682 Refer. 0.461 Refer. 
Age 39.18 (12.10) 0.031** 
40.87 
(11.3) 0.017 
39.49 
(11.3) 0.061**
39.85 
(10.36) 0.022** 
37.60 
(10.7) 0.017**
37.69 
(11.00) 0.031* 
39.46 
(11.73) 0.000* 
39.24 
(89.56) 0.021**
40.77 
(10.92) 0.005** 
Age*age 1681.3 (970.7) 0.000** 
1799.1 
(919.4) 0.000 
1687.74
(884.3) -0.001**
1695.4 
(824.11) 0.000** 
130.0 
(856.1) 0.000**
1541.7 
(871.89) 0.000**
1694.9 
(954.92) 0.000** 
1631.3 
(772.1) 0.000**
1781.5 
(906.5) 0.000** 
Tenure 7.38 (8.8) 0.006** 
10.36 
(10.6) 0.012**
7.68 
(9.0) 0.010**
11.18 
(10.3) 0.012** 
7.80 
(9.6) 0.017**
9.52 
(9.68) 0.017* 
3.81 
(5.39) 0.029* 
11.27 
(10.3) 0.011**
7.23 
(810.3) 0.015** 
Tenure*tenure 131.87 (268.2) 0.000** 
219.22 
(371.0) 0.000**
139.15 
(262.4) 0.000**
232.17 
(343.9) 0.000** 
153.0 
(292.8) 0.000**
184.42 
(299.57) 0.000**
43.63 
(149.76) -0.001** 
232.72 
(351.8) 0.000**
120.4 
(244.2) 0.000** 
Primary education 0.039 Refer. 0.003 Refer. 0.082 Refer. 0.000 Refer. 0.259 Refer. 0.507 Refer. 0.003 Refer. 0.072 Refer. 0.006 Refer. 
Lower secondary education 0.109 -0.032** 0.113 0.002 0.178 0.076** 0.090 - 0.285 0.003 0.184 0.120* 0.103 -0.034** 0.408 0.045** 0.058 0.016 
Upper secondary education 0.612 0.019** 0.718 0.064 0.395 0.168** 0.717 0.074** 0.173 0.031** 0.205 0.134 0.316 -0.005* 0.410 0.123** 0.329 0.044** 
Post-secondary education 0.037 0.057** 0.000 - 0.049 0.215** 0.000 - 0.000 -0.087 0.000 - 0.356 0.009** 0.018 0.142** 0.199 0.071** 
Tertiary education 0.200 0.151** 0.158 0.263** 0.292 0.378** 0.189 0.225** 0.280 0.060** 0.104 0.280 0.217 0.145 0.085 0.219** 0.403 0.174** 
Postgraduate 0.004 0.238** 0.008 0.456** 0.005 0.630** 0.003 0.472** 0.003 0.062** 0.000 - 0.004 0.219 0.006 0.272** 0.005 0.416** 
Fixed-term 0.027 -0.054** 0.128 -0.093** 0.171 -0.094** 0.096 -0.025** 0.259 -0.066** 0.192 -0.059** 0.066 0.046** 0.963 -0.052** 0.914 -0.025** 
Indefinite duration 0.973 Refer. 0.872 Refer. 0.829 Refer. 0.904 Refer. 0.741 Refer. 0.808 Refer. 0.934 Refer. 0.037 Refer. 0.086 Refer. 
Part-time 0.207 -0.045** 0.100 -0.001** 0.481 -0.024** 0.035 -0.103** 0.101 0.027** 0.015 0.331** 0.119 -0.148* 0.886 0.049** 0.865 -0.161** 
Full-time 0.793 Refer. 0.900 Refer. 0.519 Refer. 0.965 Refer. 0.899 Refer. 0.985 Refer. 0.881 Refer. 0.114 Refer. 0.135 Refer. 
Isco 11 0.000 Refer. 0.005 Refer. 0.003 Refer. 0.001 Refer. 0.000 Refer. 0.000 Refer. 0.000 Refer. 0.001 Refer. 0.008 Refer. 
Isco 12 0.065 0.081* 0.035 0.306** 0.066 -0.046* 0.032 -0.037** 0.023 -0.168 0.030 0.635** 0.077 -0.429** 0.013 0.130** 0.092 -0.330** 
Isco 13 0.012 -0.111** 0.008 -0.002** 0.016 -0.128** 0.005 -0.337** 0.000 -  0.000 0.430** 0.020 -0.488 0.003 0.085 0.000  
Isco 21 0.048 -0.164** 0.026 -0.166** 0.036 -0.158** 0.026 -0.446** 0.029 -0.416* 0.024 0.429** 0.032 -0.668** 0.003 -0.034 0.026 -0.587** 
Isco 22 0.001 -0.087** 0.014 -0.016** 0.023 -0.071** 0.016 -0.103** 0.027 -0.391* 0.001 0.392** 0.005 -0.724** 0.000 -0.233** 0.022 -0.456** 
Isco 23 0.000 -0.362** 0.016 -0.102** 0.086 -0.180** 0.018 -0.349** 0.032 -0.380 0.000 0.333** 0.000 -0.571** 0.000 -0.073 0.090 0.027 
Isco 24 0.028 -0.132** 0.043 -0.136** 0.074 -0.143** 0.036 -0.484** 0.024 -0.445* 0.016 0.313** 0.055 -0.523** 0.001 -0.059 0.071 -0.526** 
Isco 31 0.070 -0.237** 0.086 -0.198** 0.039 -0.257** 0.079 -0.599** 0.046 -0.690** 0.046 0.089** 0.035 -0.739** 0.032 -0.652** 0.018 -0.694** 
Isco 32 0.003 -0.309** 0.049 -0.117** 0.071 -0.189** 0.064 -0.413** 0.004 -0.781** 0.001 0.060** 0.005 -0.522** 0.002 -0.704** 0.040 -0.776** 
Isco 33 0.000 -0.247** 0.002 -0.083** 0.000 -0.369** 0.003 -0.463** 0.002 -0.821** 0.000 -0.081** 0.000 -0.641** 0.030 -0.617** 0.012 -0.238** 
Isco 34 0.098 -0.271** 0.100 -0.182** 0.089 -0.256** 0.069 -0.536** 0.097 -0.682** 0.077 0.201** 0.059 -0.686** 0.018 -0.710** 0.063 -0.688** 
Isco 41 0.128 -0.431** 0.051 -0.380** 0.099 -0.331** 0.047 -0.721** 0.082 -0.907** 0.173 -0.116** 0.074 -0.818** 0.337 -0.736** 0.042 -0.855** 
Isco 42 0.024 -0.416** 0.024 -0.362** 0.033 -0.358** 0.026 -0.733** 0.032 -0.898** 0.024 -0.211** 0.014 -0.889** 0.000 - 0.012 -0.940** 
Isco 51 0.051 -0.419** 0.046 -0.518** 0.072 -0.315** 0.043 -0.848** 0.073 -0.953** 0.033 -0.205** 0.054 -1.000** 0.013 -0.785** 0.064 -0.929** 
Isco 52 0.117 -0.401** 0.022 -0.461** 0.030 -0.330** 0.025 -0.688** 0.036 -0.853** 0.038 -0.231** 0.097 -0.912** 0.080 -0.807** 0.032 -0.897** 
Isco 61 0.001 -0.454** 0.001 -0.499** 0.009 -0.428** 0.001 -0.889** 0.002 -1.076** 0.000 -0.226** 0.002 -1.020** 0.031 -0.868** 0.001 -1.018** 
Isco 71 0.036 -0.390** 0.033 -0.444** 0.016 -0.374** 0.037 -0.768** 0.063 -0.904** 0.047 -0.183** 0.056 -0.894** 0.030 -0.852** 0.059 -0.883** 
Isco 72 0.066 -0.383** 0.140 -0.394** 0.025 -0.364** 0.123 -0.752** 0.069 -0.888** 0.094 -0.139** 0.085 -0.791** 0.118 -0.880** 0.063 -0.782** 
Isco 73 0.004 -0.327** 0.014 -0.423** 0.003 -0.325** 0.008 -0.691** 0.007 -0.942** 0.012 -0.271** 0.006 -0.951** 0.016 -0.877** 0.003 -0.883** 
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Isco 74 0.014 -0.415** 0.024 -0.453** 0.004 -0.343** 0.040 -0.770** 0.023 -0.979** 0.084 -0.297** 0.073 -0.900** 0.067 -0.907** 0.031 -0.865** 
Isco 81 0.041 -0.337** 0.057 -0.390** 0.007 -0.273** 0.069 -0.724** 0.028 -0.897** 0.028 -0.199** 0.032 -0.859** 0.012 -0.818** 0.019 -0.862** 
Isco 82 0.055 -0.423** 0.077 -0.400** 0.016 -0.369** 0.073 -0.749** 0.119 -0.941** 0.093 -0.238** 0.030 -0.766** 0.084 -0.904** 0.056 -0.786** 
Isco 83 0.037 -0.464** 0.061 -0.432** 0.020 -0.362** 0.084 -0.717** 0.054 -0.923** 0.057 -0.177** 0.082 -0.855** 0.000 - 0.065 -0.850** 
Isco 91 0.043 -0.473** 0.029 -0.618** 0.055 -0.456** 0.035 -0.964** 0.067 -1.057** 0.055 -0.379** 0.061 -1.081** 0.061 -0.923** 0.089 -1.111** 
Isco 92 0.001 -0.442** 0.000 -0.638** 0.000 -0.463** 0.000 -1.128** 0.001 -1.047** 0.000 - 0.001 -0.872** 0.001 -0.849** 0.001 -0.972** 
Isco 93 0.018 -0.467** 0.034 -0.573** 0.022 -0.401** 0.040 -0.854** 0.063 -1.014** 0.068 -0.350** 0.045 -0.863** 0.048 -0.890** 0.021 -0.981** 
Isco 99 0.040 -0.327** 0.000 - 0.084 -0.361** 0.000 - 0.000 -  0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Size 10-49 0.172 Refer. 0.012 Refer. 0.026 Refer. 0.021 Refer 0.306 Refer. 0.261 Refer 0.435 Refer 0.297 Refer 0.219 Refer 
Size 50-249 0.256 0.029 0.100 0.065** 0.153 0.010** 0.126 0.031** 0.283 0.105** 0.320 0.113** 0.420 0.201 0.204 0.099** 0.446 0.156** 
Size 250-499 0.143 0.032 0.121 0.080** 0.140 0.014** 0.116 0.086** 0.097 0.157** 0.104 0.205** 0.062 0.408 0.155 0.157** 0.119 0.237** 
Size 500-999 0.127 0.031* 0.162 0.102** 0.105 0.016** 0.214 0.130** 0.087 0.190** 0.097 0.218** 0.030 0.390 0.113 0.188** 0.089 0.288** 
Size>999 0.301 0.040** 0.604 0.126** 0.576 0.032** 0.524 0.152** 0.227 0.199** 0.218 0.231** 0.053 0.409 0.231 0.181** 0.128 0.309** 
Publicly owned firm 0.868 -0.039** 0.616 0.029** 0.447 -0.071** 0.633 -0.069** 0.898 -0.003 0.838 0.045** 0.879 0.128** 0.919 0.022** 0.503 0.153** 
Other type of control 0.132 Refer. 0.384 Refer. 0.553 Refer. 0.367 Refer 0.091 Refer. 0.162 Refer 0.121 Refer 0.059 Refer 0.497 Refer 
Nace division 10 0.000 0.058** 0.032 0.279** 0.000            - ** 0.005 0.206** 0.003 0.359** 0.000 - 0.006 0.381 0.000 -0.262** 0.002 0.111** 
Nace division 11 0.036 0.282** 0.000 -0.035** 0.002 0.297** 0.005 0.344** 0.000 0.361** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.367** 0.001 1.035** 
Nace division 12 0.000 - 0.004 0.124** 0.000            -  0.000 - 0.000       -  0.000 -0.028** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Nace division 13 0.001 0.049** 0.000 - 0.000            -  0.002 0.033** 0.001 0.071* 0.002 0.242** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Nace division 14 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.228** 0.000 0.038** 0.001 0.156** 0.011 0.056** 0.011 0.198** 0.002 0.466 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.289** 
Nace division 15 0.058 -0.073** 0.033 0.053** 0.012 0.056** 0.036 0.059** 0.048 -0.067** 0.050 0.018** 0.072 0.036** 0.040 0.024** 0.052 -0.007 
Nace division 16 0.001 -0.057 0.001 0.492** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 0.445** 0.001 0.050* 0.001 0.017** 0.000 - 0.001 -0.023 0.001 1.011** 
Nace division 17 0.004 -0.126 0.030 0.070** 0.001 -0.040** 0.019 -0.038** 0.013 -0.176** 0.047 -0.183** 0.013 0.086** 0.030 -0.040** 0.017 0.095** 
Nace division 18 0.001 -0.197 0.008 0.012** 0.000 -0.075** 0.034 -0.110** 0.014 -0.167** 0.043 -0.153** 0.024 0.050** 0.018 -0.080** 0.041 -0.070** 
Nace division 19 0.001 -0.118 0.003 0.078* 0.000 -0.060** 0.012 -0.122** 0.012 -0.118** 0.021 -0.075** 0.002 -0.059** 0.015 -0.090** 0.003 -0.066** 
Nace division 20 0.012 -0.169 0.005 0.035** 0.000 -0.082** 0.007 -0.083** 0.021 -0.159** 0.025 -0.012** 0.059 -0.067** 0.017 -0.120** 0.019 -0.104** 
Nace division 21 0.012 -0.094** 0.006 0.141 0.003 0.063** 0.013 0.334** 0.010 -0.021* 0.022 0.178** 0.005 -0.016** 0.018 0.041** 0.003 0.209** 
Nace division 22 0.020 -0.005** 0.003 0.181** 0.009 0.071** 0.007 0.107** 0.020 -0.010 0.020 0.130** 0.019 0.080** 0.019 0.079** 0.009 -0.013 
Nace division 23 0.002 0.075** 0.003 0.226** 0.001 0.205** 0.000 0.627** 0.003 0.360** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.009 0.136** 0.001 0.814** 
Nace division 24 0.020 -0.008** 0.016 0.095 0.014 0.077** 0.029 0.187** 0.028 0.087** 0.017 0.216** 0.008 0.004 0.039 0.056** 0.005 0.185** 
Nace division 25 0.006 -0.103 0.020 0.145 0.003 -0.011** 0.016 0.279** 0.023 -0.027** 0.016 0.033** 0.008 -0.024** 0.027 0.000 0.007 0.027 
Nace division 26 0.010 -0.069 0.034 0.126** 0.003 -0.023** 0.022 0.164** 0.033 -0.023** 0.036 0.123** 0.012 0.195** 0.038 0.028** 0.009 0.099** 
Nace division 27 0.018 -0.015** 0.038 0.179** 0.004 -0.066** 0.059 0.428** 0.010 0.028** 0.012 -0.002** 0.003 0.173* 0.026 0.052** 0.002 0.083** 
Nace division 28 0.011 -0.092** 0.021 0.040** 0.005 -0.062** 0.021 0.118** 0.036 -0.053** 0.035 0.031** 0.020 0.100** 0.029 -0.007 0.011 -0.101** 
Nace division 29 0.016 -0.031** 0.052 -0.028 0.007 -0.042** 0.030 0.054** 0.028 -0.061** 0.033 0.031** 0.013 -0.010** 0.065 0.020** 0.010 -0.003 
Nace division 30 0.000 -0.065** 0.002 -0.191* 0.001 -0.142** 0.002 0.068** 0.000 -0.190** 0.000 - 0.000 0.177** 0.006 -0.012 0.000 -0.373** 
Nace division 31 0.008 -0.030** 0.030 0.052** 0.003 -0.062** 0.039 0.046** 0.023 -0.069** 0.021 0.039** 0.005 0.141** 0.028 -0.022* 0.004 0.142** 
Nace division 32 0.006 -0.088** 0.013 0.034** 0.012 -0.071** 0.012 -0.023** 0.003 -0.049** 0.014 0.001** 0.003 -0.090** 0.019 -0.014 0.005 0.010 
Nace division 33 0.005 0.008** 0.008 -0.024* 0.002 -0.152** 0.004 0.220** 0.003 -0.056** 0.006 0.097** 0.003 -0.061** 0.017 -0.005 0.004 0.053* 
Nace division 34 0.006 -0.074* 0.049 0.195 0.004 -0.041** 0.031 0.185** 0.022 -0.012* 0.028 0.088** 0.002 0.057** 0.036 0.030** 0.001 -0.039 
Nace division 35 0.026 -0.045 0.010 0.035* 0.004 -0.020** 0.007 0.107** 0.009 -0.035** 0.012 0.009** 0.007 0.040** 0.019 -0.035** 0.008 0.231** 
Nace division 36 0.008 -0.057** 0.012 0.054 0.027 -0.175** 0.005 0.160** 0.024 -0.128** 0.016 -0.030** 0.020 0.016** 0.022 -0.116** 0.015 -0.053** 
Nace division 37 0.001 -0.053 0.001 0.070 0.000 -0.012* 0.001 0.043** 0.001 -0.125** 0.002 0.153** 0.001 -0.034** 0.006 -0.011 0.002 -0.094** 
Nace division 40 0.021 -0.085** 0.029 0.204** 0.007 0.088** 0.029 0.485** 0.012 0.100** 0.015 0.342** 0.025 0.162 0.019 0.060** 0.020 0.040** 
Nace division 41 0.000       -  0.013 0.054** 0.001 0.055** 0.019 0.230** 0.010 -0.030** 0.005 0.110** 0.002 0.114** 0.006 0.092** 0.008 -0.052** 
Nace division 45 0.067 Refer. 0.033 Refer. 0.020 Refer.* 0.032 Refer 0.072 Refer. 0.064 Refer* 0.101 Refer* 0.026 Refer 0.075 Refer 
Nace division 50 0.023 -0.057** 0.004 0.082 0.006 -0.088** 0.004 0.305** 0.009 -0.093** 0.030 0.037** 0.036 -0.018** 0.017 0.003 0.020 -0.107** 
Nace division 51 0.073 -0.030 0.010 0.036** 0.026 -0.016** 0.018 0.066** 0.032 -0.072** 0.043 0.023** 0.107 0.062** 0.034 0.001 0.036 -0.028** 
Nace division 52 0.125 -0.137** 0.044 -0.106** 0.068 -0.150** 0.032 0.092** 0.047 -0.092** 0.029 -0.131** 0.142 -0.123** 0.049 -0.089** 0.044 -0.123** 
Nace division 55 0.057 -0.074** 0.010 0.044** 0.008 -0.140** 0.003 0.075** 0.054 -0.039** 0.047 0.015** 0.026 0.103** 0.023 -0.131** 0.013 -0.089** 
Nace division 60 0.034 -0.069 0.074 0.136** 0.015 -0.020** 0.135 0.160** 0.029 -0.042** 0.034 0.060** 0.052 -0.031** 0.036 -0.062** 0.038 -0.137** 
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Nace division 61 0.018 -0.031 0.000 - 0.001 0.085** 0.001 0.299** 0.001 0.086** 0.003 0.272** 0.001 0.415 0.005 0.116** 0.003 0.220** 
Nace division 62 0.020 0.128** 0.004 0.469** 0.007 0.085** 0.001 0.337** 0.002 0.212** 0.017 0.328** 0.002 0.209 0.004 0.283** 0.001 0.262** 
Nace division 63 0.018 -0.039** 0.008 0.205** 0.008 0.040** 0.003 0.133** 0.014 -0.006 0.017 0.326** 0.035 0.319** 0.026 0.042** 0.012 0.207** 
Nace division 64 0.063 -0.039** 0.046 0.115** 0.030 -0.060** 0.048 0.132** 0.011 -0.036** 0.018 0.289** 0.031 0.119** 0.009 0.051** 0.016 0.011 
Nace division 65 0.050 -0.085** 0.031 0.021** 0.033 0.123** 0.016 0.565** 0.036 0.160** 0.107 0.305** 0.015 0.344 0.059 0.305** 0.013 0.405** 
Nace division 66 0.015 -0.104** 0.009 0.066** 0.013 0.076** 0.008 0.216** 0.011 0.078** 0.004 0.358** 0.004 0.227 0.015 0.177** 0.006 0.220** 
Nace division 67 0.007 0.187 0.000 0.513** 0.002 0.017** 0.000 0.486** 0.002 0.086** 0.004 0.378** 0.002 0.452 0.008 0.080** 0.001 -0.073 
Nace division 70 0.008 -0.019** 0.008 0.085** 0.005 0.086** 0.004 0.226** 0.002 0.066** 0.005 -0.001** 0.046 0.164 0.006 0.023 0.012 0.073** 
Nace division 71 0.004 -0.040* 0.000 0.358** 0.001 -0.074** 0.000 0.112** 0.002 -0.086** 0.010 0.043** 0.003 0.518** 0.005 0.020 0.000 0.156** 
Nace division 72 0.032 0.066* 0.001 -0.069** 0.011 -0.033** 0.004 0.613** 0.005 -0.139** 0.012 0.088** 0.010 0.179** 0.024 0.020* 0.004 0.109** 
Nace division 73 0.010 -0.146* 0.006 -0.154** 0.006 -0.036** 0.009 0.018** 0.001 -0.227** 0.003 0.135** 0.009 -0.800** 0.005 0.008 0.007 -0.408** 
Nace division 74 0.064 -0.045** 0.029 -0.116** 0.082 -0.031** 0.014 0.043** 0.078 -0.108** 0.040 0.153** 0.045 0.135** 0.069 -0.152** 0.024 0.001 
Nace division 75 0.000 -  0.058 0.000** 0.131 0.063 0.028 0.007** 0.000 -  0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.088 -0.012 
Nace division 80 0.000 -  0.029 -0.272** 0.130 0.003** 0.036 -0.109** 0.051 -0.176** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.183 -0.362** 
Nace division 85 0.000 -  0.099 0.013** 0.248 0.044** 0.122 -0.017** 0.067 -0.159** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.100 -0.273** 
Nace division 90 0.000 -  0.009 0.032** 0.004 0.064** 0.004 0.055** 0.008 0.062** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.013 0.032** 
Nace division 91 0.000 -  0.000 -0.172** 0.008 -0.043** 0.001 -0.643** 0.010 -0.156** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.002 0.135** 
Nace division 92 0.000 -  0.013 -0.188** 0.008 0.022 0.004 -0.015** 0.023 -0.042** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.025 -0.310** 
Nace division 93 0.000 -  0.001 0.057** 0.002 -0.060** 0.004 0.113** 0.006 -0.171** 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.004 -0.075** 
Share of females  0.365 (0.21) -0.024** 
0.465 
(0.26) -0.294**
0.507 
(0.30) -0.079**
0.461 
(0.24) -0.380** 
0.353 
(0.30) -0.114**
0.380 
(0.31) -0.051**
0.434 
(0.26) -0.067** 
0.318 
(0.25) -0.046 **
0.539 
(80.29) -0.112 ** 
Average age 39.18 (4.7) 0.001 
40.88 
(3.4) -0.018**
39.49 
(5.8) 0.001**
39.85 
(2.9) -0.018** 
37.6 
(5.9) 0.003**
37.69 
(6.2) 0.004**
39.46 
(5.3) -0.009** 
39.24 
(4.9) 0.000  
40.77 
(4.6) -0.009 ** 
Average tenure  7.38 (4.7) -0.002** 
10.36 
(5.3) -0.005**
7.68 
(4.7) 0.002**
11.18 
(5.0) -0.004** 
7.80 
(6.7) 0.003**
9.52 
(6.6) -0.003**
3.81 
(3.3) 0.021** 
11.27 
(5.5) 0.002 ** 7.23 (4.8) 0.006 ** 
Share high-educated workers 0.203 (0.18) 0.209** 
0.166 
(0.168) 0.537**
0.297 
(0.26) 0.042**
0.192 
(0.14) 0.202** 
0.283 
(0.30) 0.121**
0.104 
(0.17) 0.240**
0.221 
(0.20) 0.860** 
0.092 
(0.15) 0.093 **
0.408 
(0.26) 0.310 ** 
Share low-educated workers  0.147 (0.09) -0.083** 
0.116 
(0.098) -0.117**
0.259 
(0.23) -0.134**
0.090 
(0.07) -0.086** 
0.543 
(0.35) -0.089**
0.691 
(0.30) -0.178**
0.106 
(0.14) 0.132** 
0.480 
(0.31) -0.065 **
0.064 
(0.09) 0.079 ** 
R2   0.621  0.613  0.625  0.546  0.577  0.700  0.392  0.560  0.493 
Adjusted R2  0.621  0.613  0.625  0.546  0.577  0.700  0.392  0.560  0.493 
Number of observations 566,812 972,729 78,215 392,329 214,911 58,049 177,891 80,880 137,233 
Number of establishments 7,491 2,274 6,373 472 21,615 6,604 5,023 8,778 5,601 
Notes: In the case of continuous variables standard deviation is in parenthesis.  * ρ < 0.01; ** ρ < 0.05.  
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Table A.2 
Earnings inequality in Europe (EU-25 plus Norway). 
ESES 2002. 
Country 90-10 50-10 90-50
Finland 1.96 1.32 1.48
Norway 1.98 1.30 1.52
Sweden 2.03 1.27 1.59
Denmark 2.14 1.34 1.60
Italy 2.46 1.38 1.78
Belgium 2.62 1.59 1.64
Greece 2.63 1.47 1.75
Netherlands 2.75 1.57 1.75
Czech Republic 2.80 1.63 1.71
Austria 3.03 1.54 1.95
Cyprus 3.11 1.58 1.94
Spain 3.15 1.58 1.96
Germany 3.15 1.78 1.78
United Kingdom 3.16 1.59 1.97
Slovakia 3.21 1.66 1.93
Portugal 3.32 1.51 2.21
France 3.36 1.64 2.00
Luxembourg 3.40 1.76 1.99
Hungary 3.40 1.63 2.05
Ireland 3.91 1.78 2.17
Slovenia 4.50 2.09 2.08
Latvia 4.55 1.91 2.37
Poland 4.67 1.99 2.27
Lithuania 4.76 1.69 2.82
Estonia 4.94 2.20 2.22
Notes: Eurostat (2005). 90-10 differential, 50-10 differential and 90-50 
differential are the ratios of the 10th, 50th and 90th deciles of the 
wage distribution.  
 
 
 
 
